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INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom tends to treat constitutional arrangements, such as the allocation of foreign affairs powers, as
socially beneficial constraints that are interpreted behind a veil
1
of ignorance. According to this view, since these arrangements
mutually constrain (or empower) political actors across partisan lines, such actors should have no incentive to alter or ma2
nipulate these arrangements for partisan gain. Here, one key
argument is that by taking the long view, the framers adopted
a decision-making structure for foreign affairs that purportedly
increased the likelihood that a broader range of interests would
3
be considered. Thus, one might expect judges—or even other
constitutional interpreters within the political branches—to eschew purely political considerations in construing or interpreting the allocation of foreign affairs authority between Congress
and the President.
This Article suggests the contrary: even if the allocation of
foreign affairs powers was originally negotiated behind a veil of
ignorance, contemporary politicians can and do pursue narrow
1. More generally, there is a longstanding debate regarding the benefits
of the separation of powers in foreign affairs between pro-Congress scholars
who emphasize the benefits of deliberation by multiple actors and proPresident scholars who emphasize the benefits of policy flexibility. But both
sides assume that the constitutional structure will likely produce policy effects
that are socially beneficial. See Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the WarPowers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV. 993, 996–97 (2006) (describing contours
of the debate between pro-Congress and pro-President scholars in foreign affairs); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 697 (1997) (listing those scholars that advocate a pro-presidential view of war powers).
2. Consider, for instance, this observation by Daryl Levinson:
It is a common observation about institutional—and constitutional—
design that actors might take a less self-interested, more impartial
view of political decisionmaking structures that they expect to be in
place for relatively long periods of time simply because they cannot
predict how these institutions will affect their own interests.
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 694 (2011).
3. For a discussion of how veil of ignorance rules apply in the context of
constitutional design, please see Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001); see also John O. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 545 (1999) (applying a veil of
ignorance to the selection of justices sitting on cases).
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partisan objectives in their efforts to shape both the interpretation and our modern understanding of those powers. In this
picture, the ultimate objective of advocating or disavowing constitutional constraints in foreign affairs can be self-serving and
strategic; in other words, partisan officials do not expect such
constraints to be mutually constraining on policy outcomes in a
symmetric fashion, but rather hope that they can serve primarily to constrain policy outcomes favored by their political adver4
saries. Conversely, officials will seek to relax constitutional
constraints on policy issues in which they have an electoral ad5
vantage.
At bottom, a partisan approach to constitutional constraints in foreign affairs is likely to exist whenever the threats
that may arise from relaxing such constraints are not symmet6
rical. For instance, a hawkish government may not be worried
about establishing new precedent that relaxes constraints on
presidential war powers because it will not necessarily be
threatened if a future dovish government decides to invoke that
precedent for its own political ambitions. By contrast, a dovish
government that favors greater constraints over war powers
may not really be engaging in an act of mutual constraint, but
may simply be seeking to constrain the actions of a future
hawkish government. In both kinds of regimes, political actors
may have an incentive to develop partisan affinity for particu7
lar visions of the Foreign Affairs Constitution, regardless of
4. Jon Elster has also discussed other circumstances where constitutional arrangements that look like they are self-binding are really intended to bind
others. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 92–94 (2000) (“Many writers have argued that political constitutions are devices for precommitment or selfbinding, created by the body politic in order to protect itself against its own
predictable tendency to make unwise decisions.”).
5. For a discussion of how having an electoral advantage helps politicians in changing the constraints on policy issues, see Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita et al., Policy Failure and Political Survival: The Contribution of Political Institutions, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 147 passim (1999).
6. See Jide Nzelibe, Partisan Conflicts over Presidential Authority, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 389, 392–93 (2011) (giving an example of how this partisan approach to constitutional constraints might look).
7. For ease of exposition, I will refer often to those provisions of the
United States Constitution that govern the allocation of foreign affairs authority between the political branches simply as the “Foreign Affairs Constitution.” More broadly, the Constitution grants Congress the following foreign
relations powers in Article I, Section 8: regulation of foreign commerce; regulation of naturalization and immigration; criminalization and punishment of piracy and other felonies on the high seas and offenses against international
law; the power to declare war; the power to authorize private citizens to retal-
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which party occupies the White House. Nonetheless, societal
groups whose ultimate goal may be to advance partisan objectives may obscure their motivations in high-minded language
about how their visions of constitutional authority advance the
8
national interest.
Two developments have influenced this distributional dynamic in which the Foreign Affairs Constitution can be pressed
into the service of certain partisan groups at the expense of
others. First, the established constitutional doctrine governing
the allocation of foreign affairs authority is sufficiently sparse
and ambiguous that there is often significant leeway for political actors to influence the contours of foreign affairs authority
to suit their political objectives. Moreover, the unwillingness of
courts to intervene in many foreign affairs controversies gives
elected officials opportunities to promote those constitutional
constraints that they predict will bring them the greatest dis9
tributional benefits.
Second, and more importantly, the Foreign Affairs Constitution is sufficiently unbundled that societal groups can often
reasonably estimate whether a particular interpretation of a
foreign affairs power is good or bad for them, and these judgments will often depend on factors that divide along partisan
lines. Typically, uncertainty over distributional outcomes is
likely to be pronounced when a particular constitutional constraint or institutional arrangement bundles together a whole
iate against citizens or ships of foreign nations; and the power to raise, regulate, and maintain an army and navy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4, 10–15. In
addition, Article II grants the President power to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and to appoint ambassadors. Id.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the positions that interest groups
stake out on the allocation of foreign affairs authority is motivated entirely (or
even mostly) by redistributive partisan objectives. Indeed, domestic groups—
including partisan elites—may oppose or support a specific allocation of foreign affairs authority because of principled policy reasons largely detached
from partisan considerations. This Article focuses largely on partisan considerations because it has been neglected or sidelined in the literature.
9. There is a long literature that documents the reluctance of courts to
intervene in foreign affairs controversies. See PETER W. LOW, JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 542 (7th ed. 2011) (“Though successful resort to the
political question doctrine in purely domestic disputes is unusual, the doctrine
may have greater vitality in foreign affairs.”); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of
Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 943 (2004) (concluding that “reports of
the [political question] doctrine’s demise in foreign affairs are greatly exaggerated”).
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10

range of policies or policy outcomes. In such a picture, bundling helps ensure that no partisan group is likely to view the
constraint or institution purely as an arrangement that confers
one-sided benefits on its political adversaries since all political
11
actors must take the good along with the bad. But the Foreign
Affairs Constitution can be unbundled in such a way that the
constraints which govern the making of human rights agreements can often be distinguished from those for making war,
which can in turn be distinguished from those involved in negotiating international trade agreements. Since the constitutional
authority of foreign affairs can almost be effectively unbundled
on an issue-by-issue basis, societal groups have an incentive to
stake out positions on constitutional constraints in foreign affairs that map onto their partisan preferences regarding the
underlying issue area. Thus, a right-leaning or Republican
group may favor more constraints (or more veto points) on the
constitutional powers that govern the negotiation and ratification of human rights agreements, but less on those that govern
12
the decision to go to war.
For a concrete contemporary illustration of this partisan
dynamic, let us consider the ongoing debate regarding the do13
mestic legal effects of treaties ratified by the Senate. At first
glance, the controversy as to whether ratified treaties should be
10. Thus, for instance, Congress’s institutional authority is typically
viewed as bundling together a variety of policy domains since it employs the
same process when it passes legislation on social welfare, health, the economy,
or any other matter within its constitutional ambit. For a recent account that
endorses a constitutional vision in which power is unbundled along specific
policy domains, see Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301,
302–08 (2010).
11. However, some scholars argue that bundling powers together can be
problematic because it puts too much power into one place. See id. at 328–38.
12. See Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 404 (“Thus, a right-leaning party can
choose to support presidential flexibility in the use of force, but favor greater
constraints on the President's authority when it comes to human rights treaties.”).
13. See Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2128–29 (1999) (contending that the opinion during
Convention and ratification debates support the notion that “treaties would be
presumptively self-executing”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Response, Laughing
at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169–70 (1999) (defending a reading of
Supremacy Clause that results in self-execution of treaties). But see John C.
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961, 2024–74 (1999) (contending that evidence supports the view that Founders intended treaties to be
non-self-executing).
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presumptively treated as self-executing might seem both in14
nocuous and academic. But when one peels beneath the surface, one discovers that much of the debate masks significant
differences among the interlocutors about a single issue: the
domestic implications of human rights treaties. Put differently,
debates in favor of or against the presumption of self-execution
in treaties often have little or no implications for decisions of
the United States to go to war, enter into international trade
15
agreements, or disperse foreign aid. Thus, invariably, where
one stands on the issue of the presumption for or against selfexecution is very likely to map into one’s preferences or beliefs
regarding the merits of domestically binding human rights
agreements. In the United States, however, such debates about
human rights agreements often expose a particularly deep
fault-line that has divided core constituencies aligned with the
Republican and Democratic Parties since the end of World War
16
II (WWII).
From a normative perspective, one may argue that one way
to resolve this strategic partisan dynamic would be to ensure
that judges and informed commentators play a greater role in
the interpretation of foreign affairs powers. But rather than
depoliticize the allocation of foreign relations authority, such a
move may simply re-characterize the underlying problem. To be
sure, while judges and academic commentators may have professional and institutional incentives not to act as single17
minded maximizers of partisan objectives, they are likely to
be susceptible to cognitive biases and the kinds of motivated
14. For clarification, self-executing treaties are those in which domestic
courts can presumably provide a remedy for a treaty violation, while non-selfexecuting treaties are those in which courts cannot. For a discussion of how
treaty self-execution works in American domestic law, see David Sloss, SelfExecuting Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 346 (2004).
15. See id., at 348 (noting that whether or not a treaty is self-executory
only affects whether a treaty “creates individual rights under international
law”).
16. For an incisive overview of the societal battles over human rights
agreements in the United States, see Christopher Nigel Roberts, Exploring
Fractures Within Human Rights: An Empirical Study of Resistance (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan), available at http://
deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78882/1/cnrobert_1.pdf.
17. But that does not preclude the possibility that the Justices might not
have strong policy preferences over case outcomes even if such policy preferences are not always partisan. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22–51 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices have
policy objectives in mind when making all of their decisions).
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reasoning that may lead them to make judgments that closely
18
track partisan divisions.
Let us return, for instance, to the question of the domestic
legal implications of human rights treaties. A judge trying to
resolve the question as to whether human rights agreements
can be domestically binding on state officials may resort not
just to textual sources, but also to functional judgments as to
what the constitutional allocation of powers is trying to
achieve, such as the reduction of agency costs (in this example,
minimizing capture by interest groups or temporary majorities). But judgments about the source of agency costs are very
likely to be plagued by partisan biases even if such biases may
19
be unconscious. For instance, a right-leaning judge may be inclined to conclude that multiple veto points are necessary when
ratifying human rights agreements not because she is being
strategic, but because she is more likely to believe that human
rights agreements are particularly susceptible to capture by
left-leaning special interest groups whose preferences may deviate from that of the median voter. On the other hand, a leftleaning judge or commentator may likely think that the agency
cost problem in ratifying human rights agreements cuts in the
opposite direction; in other words, she may tend to believe that
the agency problem is caused by narrow right-leaning groups
exploiting the domestic fragmentation of power to thwart human rights agreements purportedly favored by a “majority.” In
each case, both left- and right-leaning judges may try to engage
18. As some commentators have suggested, because of motivated reasoning, it is likely that a judge’s functional judgments will be skewed in favor of
his or her personal views. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010
Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) [hereinafter
Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term] (“[A] person who genuinely desires to
make a fair or accurate judgment [often] is unwittingly impelled to make a determination that favors some personal interest.”).
19. See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging:
What Difference Does It Make, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging] (“[The] proponents [of ideological models of judging] have failed, in particular, to distinguish between values as a self-conscious motive for decisionmaking and values
as a subconscious influence on cognition.”); see also Kahan, The Supreme
Court, 2010 Term, supra note 18, at 2 (“[C]onstitutional decisionmaking [is
often] the focus of status competition among groups whose members are unconsciously motivated to fit perceptions of the Court’s decisions to their values.”); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 28 (1993) (demonstrating the effect of cognitive bias experimentally with a sample of trained statisticians).

2013]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION

845

in principled “non-partisan” decision-making, but their empirical assumptions about the source of agency costs and how the
Constitution purports to resolve these agency-cost problems
may be radically different.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I critically
reviews other accounts in the literature that seek to explain
changes in the Foreign Affairs Constitution. Part II introduces
a societal conflict account that explains why interest groups
that are aligned with each of the major political parties have
often disagreed over the scope of the foreign relations authority.
Part III illustrates how this partisan logic operates to produce partisan conflicts over presidential war powers and the
authority to bind the country to international human rights
commitments. In the postwar years from 1950–1960, when the
expansion of the national security state was complementary to
the ambitions of the New Deal, President Truman and progressive Democrats favored greater executive branch flexibility in
both war powers and the ratification of human rights treaties.
Republicans and conservative Democrats, on the other hand,
viewed the expansion of executive branch authority in foreign
affairs during that era as a threat to the material and ideological interests of their core constituents. When President Reagan
came into power in the 1980s and was able to pursue a cleavage
politics of guns or butter, in which the growth of the national
security state was decoupled from that of the welfare state,
progressive and conservative coalitions cemented a switch of
their preferences on war powers which started with the Vietnam War. However, the ratification of human rights treaties
continues to exhibit the same postwar trajectory of distributional partisan conflict. This Part concludes with an analysis of
contemporary episodes that seem in tension with the partisan
framework: President Obama’s 2011 decision to direct airstrikes against Libya, and President Clinton’s military interventions in Haiti and Somalia in the 1990s. In all of these cases, Republican members of Congress appeared either
ambivalent about or opposed to an aggressive vision of presidential war powers pushed by a Democratic President.
Part IV explores the question as to whether the partisan
incentives can be muted by having courts play a greater role in
shaping the contours of the Foreign Affairs Constitution. Part
V concludes and examines some implications of the partisan
framework for normative constitutional theorizing.
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I. COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE
This Part critically examines two instrumental accounts
that might help explain constitutional change in foreign affairs:
institutional and ideational. In doing so, it brackets any discussion of non-instrumental explanations which might include a
genuine desire by political actors and courts to conform to their
20
evolving understanding of constitutional constraints, respons21
es to shocks from the international environment, or the recognition that certain institutional forms are better equipped to
22
handle specific foreign policy issues. To be clear, that is not to
say these latter factors do not play a role in explaining constitutional change as well, but this Article focuses on instrumental motivations because they have not figured as prominently
in debates in the legal literature.

20. There is a growing and significant amount of literature that explores
how historical practice informs the evolution of foreign affairs powers. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2012), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1999516; see also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S.
YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH 4 (2008) (“[A] foundational principle of law is that to some degree what
the law is on the books is determined by what it actually is in practice.”).
Moreover, debates about the appropriate understanding of the President’s Article II powers in foreign affairs are hardly static, and new perspectives about
how to understand the contours of these powers are relatively common. Compare, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 256–57 (2001) (arguing that the vesting clause under Article II is an independent source of executive power in foreign affairs), with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 passim (2004) (disagreeing with the vesting clause argument). Also, some commentators have argued that international law can inform our evolving understanding of the
Constitution’s “Commander-in-Chief” clause. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief
Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 73–74, 82–83 (2007).
21. Sometimes, the source of the shock that produces a change need not be
external, as some have argued about the role of the American Civil War. See
Thomas H. Lee, The Civil War in U.S. Foreign Relations Law: A Dress Rehearsal for Modern Transformations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 53–56 (2008).
22. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design,
115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523 (2006) (arguing that “the executive is structured for
speed and decisiveness in its actions and is better able to maintain secrecy in
its information gathering and its deliberations” than Congress, and that it
“has access to broader forms of information about foreign affairs”).
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A. INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTS
An alternative explanation for politically inspired changes
in the Foreign Affairs Constitution focuses on the preferences
of institutional actors. The underlying assumption is that conflict between the President and Congress often results in incremental changes to the boundary of the foreign affairs powers. In these power tussles, however, the President presumably
prevails for two reasons. The first is that due to the singular
nature of the President’s office, he has intrinsic institutional
reasons to increase his authority since he gets to consume ex23
clusively the benefits of any such usurpation. As Daryl Levinson puts it, “[b]ecause individual presidents can consume a
much greater share of the power of their institution than individual members of Congress, we should expect them to be will24
ing to invest more in institutional aggrandizement.” By contrast, the prospect of facing frequent elections and collectiveaction problems often make it unlikely that members of Congress will have an incentive to protect or expand their constitu25
tional prerogatives in foreign affairs. The second is that Pres23. See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPEND166 (2000) (“[T]he [P]resident is [the] ‘sole organ of the nation in its external relations.’”); Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential
Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 399–401 (2009) (“Presidents are well
positioned to advance their policy agenda and, in so doing, expand the power
of the presidency.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always
Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255,
1291–318 (1988) (explaining why the president usually wins out against other
branches of the government on foreign affairs issues); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at
1000 (observing that electoral incentives of members of Congress often conflict
with institutional concerns).
24. Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 956 (2005). But some commentators have observed
that Congress has different tools it can use to push back against excessive executive encroachment, including non-binding resolutions, contempt proceedings, and oversight hearings. See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 725–53 (2012).
25. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 134 (1993) (showing a portion of
the War Powers Resolution which mandates that the President provide Congress with information if it requests it regarding its “constitutional
responsibilit[y]” of committing the nation to war); Koh, supra note 23, at
1297–305 (noting reasons why Congress has failed to check so many of the
Presidents’ initiatives); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 182
(1996) (“Congressional inaction has led challengers of the [P]resident’s use of
military force to seek judicial declarations that the President has violated the
Constitution.”).
ING
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idents tend to respond to the preferences of a national constituency, while members of Congress respond to the preferences of
narrower constituencies who might be less interested in foreign
26
affairs.
The institutional explanation has yielded significant insights about our understanding of the modern Foreign Affairs
Constitution, but is nonetheless incomplete. If, as
institutionalists assume, the preferences of the political
branches capture the full range of pressures on the Foreign Affairs Constitution, we should invariably expect that under a
united government a President’s co-partisans in Congress will
embrace the executive branch’s prerogative in foreign affairs
while the opposition will be against it. After all, if Congress’s
institutional will is weak in foreign affairs, the President’s copartisans in Congress might as well expend their political capital shoring up the institutional goals of their ally in the White
House. Indeed, a prevalent view in the political science literature is that divided government will tend to produce both trade
policy that is more protectionist and national security policy
27
that is less hawkish. Similar views pervade accounts that attempt to explain the evolution of war powers during united and
divided governments. As William Howell and Jon Pevehouse
put it in the context of presidential authority during wartime:
Presidential uses of force redound to the electoral benefit of members
of the president’s own party and, by implication, to the detriment of
the opposition party. Members of the president’s party, all else equal,
ought to actively support the president’s plans to exercise force
abroad, as members of the opposition party either reserve judgment
28
or voice opposition.

There is also evidence that indicates that under a united government the majority in Congress is largely acquiescent to the
29
President’s institutional demands in foreign affairs.
26. The popular notion of a national-regarding President and a parochialminded Congress has been the subject of both theoretical and empirical criticism. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Faith,
Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 128–29 (2000) (noting that the President’s constituency does not compose the whole nation, but only small sub-sets within it).
27. See Susanne Lohmann & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government
and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence, 48 INT’L ORG. 595, 614–15, 627
(1994) (concluding that divided government produces trade policy that is both
more protectionist and restrictive of presidential authority).
28. WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER:
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON WAR POWERS 37 (2007).
29. See id. at 36–40.
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But there are significant historical examples that cut in
the other direction. In the early 1950s, for instance, it was
President Eisenhower’s co-partisans in the Senate who sought
to severely constrain the executive branch’s treaty powers,
while the progressive northern Democrats largely came to his
30
defense. Similarly, during the Clinton administration, it was
Republican Party leaders in the House and Senate—including
Senator Dole and House Speaker Gingrich—who sought to introduce a bill that would circumscribe the War Powers Resolution and limit congressional interference with the President’s
31
war powers. Also, Republicans in Congress were more solicitous of giving President Clinton fast track authority in international trade; indeed, Clinton’s co-partisans in Congress were of32
ten actively hostile to his free-trade agenda. More broadly,
David Karol has shown that divided government does not have
any consistently protectionist impact on international trade
policy. Rather, divided government may lead to restrictive
trade policies if a protectionist party is the majority in Con33
gress, but facilitates greater liberalization otherwise.
Put simply, it is hard to make any generalizations about
preferences by political actors for greater presidential flexibility
on policy issues under united or divided government without
first understanding the policy preferences of the congressional
majority. If a particular expansion of presidential power furthers the long-term objectives of a particular partisan coalition
in Congress, it is reasonable to assume that such a coalition
may be willing to endorse such an expansion even when the political opposition occupies the White House. Conversely, where
a particular expansion of presidential power may hurt a party’s
long-term office-holding or policy objectives, the partisan leaders in Congress may oppose such an expansion even during periods of united government.
To be clear, that is not to say that partisan considerations
play a greater role than institutional ones in explaining the
conflicts over political branch authority in foreign affairs. On
the contrary, the claim being advanced here is much more
modest. The point is that there are sufficient empirical exceptions to the logic of unhindered presidential empire-building in
30. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion infra notes 202–31 and accompanying text.
32. See David Karol, Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much
Ado About Nothing?, 54 INT’L ORG. 825, 841–42 (2000).
33. Id.
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foreign affairs to suggest that other factors might be at play. At
bottom, the dynamic underlying the expansion of presidential
authority in foreign affairs implies that there may be tradeoffs
between institutional and partisan objectives. On the one hand,
while a President and his partisan supporters in Congress may
be pulled by shared desire to increase institutional flexibility to
achieve common policy objectives, they may also be pushed
sometimes to prefer constraints on presidential authority
where they suspect it will limit the policy space on issues
owned by the political opposition.
B. IDEATIONAL ACCOUNTS
One could also assume that the divergent views by political
parties on the allocation of foreign affairs authority are motivated primarily by ideational conflicts about which institutional arrangements can best achieve national greatness abroad,
rather than by narrow societal interests. In the ideational account, the political left is presumed to be linked philosophically
to a world-view that espouses anti-militarism, egalitarianism,
and cosmopolitanism, and thus is naturally inclined to embrace
multilateral institutions in global affairs as well as institutions
that protect individual rights and restrain government authori34
ty at home. By contrast, the right is assumed to define the national interest narrowly in terms of American sovereignty, is
more enamored of realism as a framework for understanding
the international environment, and thus will be more skeptical

34. David Luban, Essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 210 n.1 (2003) (defining progressives as those who are “socially and economically egalitarian in
domestic affairs, and cosmopolitan in international affairs”); see also Ole R.
Holsti & James N. Rosenau, The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders, 32 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 248 passim (1988) (explaining how partisan orientation affects elite beliefs in foreign policy). Within the legal academy, the growing division between proponents of a more robust international
legal framework and skeptics is usually framed in philosophical and not partisan terms, but it still loosely corresponds to a right left division. See, e.g., José
E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An ‘Empire of Law’ or the ‘Law
of Empire’?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 811, 812 (2009) (“Today’s legal academy,
particularly in the United States, reflects a divide between traditional defenders of international legalism and revisionist upstarts who question the efficacy, or at the very least the democratic legitimacy, of both global treaties negotiated within multilateral institutions and the rules of custom that are backed
by the international community.”).
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of the role of multilateralism and will prefer fewer restrictions
35
on presidential authority in foreign affairs.
But like institutional explanations, ideational accounts depict an analytical lens that is too narrow. A cursory examination of the history of political conflict over foreign relations authority or international law suggests significant departures
from the left-cosmopolitan and right-realist framework. Take,
for instance, the notion that because of its realist disposition
the Republican right will tend to prefer fewer institutional constraints in foreign affairs. As observed earlier, however, it was
Senate Republicans under the Eisenhower administration who
precipitated one of the most significant challenges to the President’s authority in foreign affairs by pushing for a constitutional amendment that would have severely constrained the Presi36
dent’s ability to enter into international treaties. More
generally, in the postwar era, Republican legislators have been
more willing than their Democratic counterparts to embrace
multilateral institutions that constrain domestic sovereignty
with respect to agreements that liberalize international trade.
On the other hand, Democratic legislators have recently been
more skeptical about giving the President more flexible authority in international trade and war, but seem to be more willing
to indulge a greater degree of executive branch flexibility in
37
human rights. At bottom, one searches in vain to find a coherent ideological or philosophical framework that unites all these
disparate positions taken by the two major political parties on
the Foreign Affairs Constitution.
Again, that is not to say such ideational accounts are unimportant, but there is a risk that their influence can be exaggerated. Even in those policy spheres where we expect ideas to
have significant traction, such as multilateralism and human
35. DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLTHE FOREIGN AID REGIME, 1949–1989, at 156–57 (1993) (describing
preference of left-leaning groups for foreign aid and opposition by rightleaning groups); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291, 297–303 (2000). Although ideational factors have been used most often to explain divergent societal preferences in international cooperation, they can presumably be extended to
analysis of preferences for constitutional constraints in foreign affairs. See
generally BRIAN C. RATHBUN, PARTISAN INTERVENTIONS: EUROPEAN PARTY
POLITICS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE BALKANS 18 (2004) (discussing the
left-right split between European political parties on the question of humanitarian intervention).
36. See supra Part I.A.
37. See supra Part I.A.
ITICS:
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rights, the effects do not seem to be that strong. For instance,
one might expect progressives to side consistently with the aggressive promotion of international law and human rights ideals at the expense of realist considerations, while conservatives
would be aligned with the opposite position. But as some commentators have observed, it was southern politicians in the early part of the twentieth century who were most supportive of
international law and the use of multilateral institutions to resolve collective security issues, and the South was then (as
38
now) hardly considered a bastion of progressive idealism.
To be sure, ideational attachments seem to have had some
impact on contemporary foreign policy debates, as illustrated
by the more idealist stance taken by President Carter earlier in
his administration in an effort to distance his legacy from the
realism of the Nixon era. Upon closer inspection, it is unlikely
that such ideational factors were determinative. When Carter
received pushback on his idealist stance from both the State
Department and his own National Security Adviser, Zbigniew
39
Brzezinski, he retreated and often adopted policy stances that
would be considered largely consistent with hard-nosed real40
ism. Similarly, although President Reagan initially opposed
the human rights stance of Carter and sought to appoint a human rights skeptic, Ernest Lefever, as the Assistant Secretary
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, he quickly capit41
ulated once he faced congressional opposition from Democrats.
Rather than persist in his realist stance, Reagan decided to appropriate the rhetoric of human rights idealism in his attacks
42
on communist regimes. Furthermore, the Republican platforms in 1980 and 1984 accused the Democrats of not being sufficiently solicitous of the human rights of citizens in Soviet Bloc
43
states, and the 1996 Republican platform also accused the
38. See PETER TRUBOWITZ, DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST:
AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 134–35 (1998).
39. See MARY E. STUCKEY,
TIONAL AGENDA 115 (2008).

CONFLICT

JIMMY CARTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NA-

40. See Hauke Hartmann, U.S. Human Rights Policy Under Carter and
Reagan, 1977–1981, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 402, 413–20 (2001).
41. See id. at 424–25; Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human
Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066, 1069–71 (1985–1986).
42. Aryeh Neier, Human Rights in the Reagan Era: Acceptance in Principle, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 30, 37–38 (1989).
43. Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July
15, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844; Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845.
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Clinton administration of not doing enough to protect the rights
of Christians suffering from atrocities in the Sudanese civil
44
war.
In sum, the ideational account does not adequately explain
the observed patterns of partisan conflict over the scope of foreign relations authority. In the next Part, I suggest that such
partisan differences are better explained by significant differences between advocacy and interest groups aligned with the
Republican and Democratic parties regarding how specific interpretations of the foreign affairs powers would affect their
material interests and values in the context of domestic political conflict. But while partisan elites might invoke the rhetoric
of normative constitutional discourse in justifying their policy
positions, such rhetoric often masks more mundane political
considerations rooted in the redistributive strategies of the different political parties. To be sure, staking out high-minded
views about constitutional constraints may frequently overlap
with the more parochial objectives of a party’s core constituents, but sometimes it will not. And when such divergences do
occur, it is not far-fetched to assume that office-seeking politicians will be willing to sacrifice ideals about optimal constitutional design for electoral self-interest. To be clear, the claim is
not that ideational explanations cannot influence the preferences of politicians for the separation of powers in foreign affairs, but that to be politically sustainable these ideas will usually have to resonate with the material or ideological interests
of core constituencies aligned with either of the political parties.
II. THE PARTISAN LOGIC OF INTERPRETIVE CHOICE IN
FOREIGN RELATIONS
This Part explains why partisan groups will often seek to
shape the scope of the Foreign Affairs Constitution to achieve
electoral or policy goals, often at the expense of the political opposition. Section A outlines the basic theoretical framework.
Section B speculates about some of the conditions that are likely to make any new rule reallocating foreign relations authority
moderately stable across multiple electoral periods.

44. Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug.
12, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848.
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A. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Constitutional constraints on foreign affairs, or the distribution of policy veto points, may often shape and influence policy outcomes in a distributional manner. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that political parties have an incentive to evaluate
the merits of any constitutional constraint based on how it
shapes policies that affect their core supporters. As significant
social science research demonstrates, elected officials are often
held accountable by a subset of the voting population, which
has been defined variously as a “selectorate,” or a minimum
45
winning coalition. This winning coalition need not represent a
majority of the population, but will often represent some portion of the population that seeks to advance its preferred inter46
est at the expense of others. Thus, in this picture, any resultant change in the Foreign Affairs Constitution may not
necessarily reflect a structure of cooperation that benefits a
majority of voters or that advances the national interest however defined. On the contrary, any partisan coalition who successfully manages to alter the rules of the game on how foreign
policy is made may be able to do so in a way that benefits its
side, and that makes the political opposition (and perhaps the
47
majority) worse off.
The theoretical framework espoused here assumes that it
is feasible to manipulate the contours of the Foreign Affairs
Constitution in a distributional manner. But it is not obvious
why this would be the case. After all, one of the prevailing theoretical justifications for the stability of constitutional rules is
that such rules are both negotiated and interpreted behind a
veil of ignorance. In this picture, the constitutional allocation of
foreign affairs authority is an efficiency-enhancing rule because
by lowering agency costs it produces benefits that are dispersed
equally to every segment of society. For instance, it should
seem uncertain to societal groups as to whether a gradual expansion of presidential authority in war powers over time
would accrue disproportionately to the benefit of right- or leftleaning constituencies; on the contrary, the prevailing view is
45. See Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 5, at 149.
46. See id. at 149–51.
47. Using institutional arrangements to advance material interests is a
common theme in the literature on international institutional design. See, e.g.,
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (exploring how interest groups might exploit
litigation and court room adjudication to advance their material interests).
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that both sides will gain equally (or lose equally) from institutions that disperse war authority. Moreover, partisan actors
may lack the requisite information about key aspects of the
strategic environment associated with changing constitutional
rules, such as whether they are likely to hold power in the near
future, what their likely payoffs will be from altering the balance of foreign affairs powers, and whether the preferences of
their core supporters will remain stable. For all these reasons,
it is reasonable to conjecture that partisan groups will be ambivalent about staking out clear or distinct positions on the
constitutional allocation of foreign affairs authority.
But there are reasons to doubt that policy outcomes associated with various allocations of foreign affairs authority will be
opaque. More importantly, specific delineations of foreign affairs authority may sometimes have asymmetric consequences
for the policy objectives favored by each party. Thus, rather
than treat constitutional rules purely as exogenous constraints
on policy outcomes, political actors may try to modify these
rules to suit their particular policy objectives. In other words,
the relationship between the allocation of constitutional authority and foreign policy objectives is partly endogenous; while
the constitutional rules structure political conflict, the scope of
these rules are often the product of ongoing political conflict.
To substantiate this argument, I will briefly sketch out a
partisan framework that relies on the following set of assumptions. First, as many commentators have observed, political
parties typically wage electoral competition by attempting to
raise the salience of the issues they own at the expense of those
48
issues owned by the political opposition. Thus, rather than
seek votes according to a spatial model of electoral competition
where each party stakes out different positions on the same issue, parties tend to appropriate issues and then often try to
compete by convincing voters that their issues are the most important. In the United States, Democrats and Republicans have
developed distinct reputations among the electorate for handling a range of foreign and domestic policy issues, which are
very likely to have a direct effect on the preferences of both parties for placing certain issues on the policy agenda. Generally,
Republicans have cultivated a better reputation for handling
48. See Éric Bélanger & Bonnie M. Meguid, Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice, 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 477, 478 (2008); John
R. Petrocik et al., Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–2000,
118 POL. SCI. Q. 599, 601–02 (2003–2004).
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matters of national security, illicit drugs, crime, and so-called
49
family-values issues. Democrats, on the other hand, have an
electoral advantage in economic redistribution, social welfare,
and other socially progressive issues implicating inter-group re50
lations.
Second, political actors will often be able to link specific de51
lineations of the foreign affairs authority to issues they own.
One key feature of the allocation of foreign affairs authority
under the United States Constitution is that different policy issues may have distinct pathways. Unbundling the foreign affairs powers allows political actors to link specific institutional
pathways to issues they own. They can then rank their preference for greater constraints over a particular pathway based
upon expectations about how it will make it more or less likely
to advance those issues in which they are considered to have an
52
advantage. Thus, Republicans may favor greater constraints
53
(or more veto points) on the constitutional powers that govern
the negotiation and ratification of human rights agreements,
but less on those that govern the decision to go to war. Democrats, on the other hand, may have an opposite set of preferences over the institutional pathways that lead to war and human rights treaties.
Third, the constitutional specification of the number and
scope of veto points is not necessarily fixed in stone, but is often
subject to constant contention. This observation does not imply
that the constitutional separation of powers is completely malleable or that it is constantly under threat from partisan forces.
Rather, the point is that at the margins the contours of such
powers are sufficiently ambiguous that partisan actors can try
to make incremental changes that shift the balance of power in
54
their favor. In the United States, for instance, there is sufficient lack of doctrinal clarity whether international agreements
49. See Petrocik et al., supra note 48, at 608–09; see also Danny Hayes,
Candidate Qualities Through a Partisan Lens: A Theory of Trait Ownership,
49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 908 passim (2005) (claiming that the American public
views Republicans as stronger leaders and more moral, while Democrats hold
advantages on compassion and empathy).
50. See Petrocik et al., supra note 48, at 608–09.
51. See generally Hayes, supra note 49, at 909–13 (developing a “trait
ownership” theory for how political parties affect voters).
52. Id. at 909.
53. Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 399–401.
54. Hayes, supra note 49, at 915–20 (espousing a theory of “expectations
gap”).
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ratified under the treaty clause are interchangeable with those
implemented through a congressional-executive agreement,
which only requires a simple majority of both houses of Con55
gress. Although one cannot measure directly whether the veto
points on one pathway are more restrictive than the other, it is
plausible that political actors can test the waters to see which
one poses a greater obstacle to ratification and choose accordingly.
At bottom, partisan pressures to change constitutional constraints in foreign affairs are likely whenever the threats of relaxing such constraints are not symmetric across the political
parties. Ideally, constraints on political authority are likely to
be durable whenever the current regime is aware that it is likely to be out of power one day and hopes to benefit from the pro56
tections afforded by those constraints. However, if an incumbent regime does not think that it will be harmed by relaxing
those constraints even when it is out of power, then it has no
incentive to seek to preserve them.
B. THE PUZZLE OF MODERATE CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Although the foregoing account suggests why politicians
may have strong incentive to change the boundaries of the foreign affairs authority for electoral purposes, it still begs the
question of why these politicians will be willing to invest significant political capital in doing so if the new rules will be susceptible to revision once the opposition comes into power. After
all, if part of the benefit of stacking the rules in your favor is to
constrain the policy space of future hostile governments, then
the proposed benefit is doubtful if these new rules immediately
become unstable.
There are certain circumstances when we would expect a
new institutional regime to be plagued by instability. If the new
55. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799, 807–13 (1995) (arguing that treaties and congressionalexecutive agreements are interchangeable); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1249–78 (1995) (taking the position
that international obligations with such an extensive scope had to be adopted
as treaties).
56. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 712 (“Constitutional restraints may
serve to fend off revolutions or to provide ‘insurance’ to current holders of
power by offering them reciprocal protection if they find themselves on the receiving end of domination.”).

858

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:838

institutional regime devised by an incumbent regime to lock in
its interests has radically asymmetric effects on the policy issues owned by the various parties, then it is unlikely that such
a regime will be durable. For instance, if a particular configuration of war powers pushed by an incumbent Republican administration always favored its constituents and hurt those aligned
with the Democratic Party, then that particular configuration
will likely be sabotaged once a Democratic administration
comes into power. So, a key objective of a winning coalition
seeking to entrench a biased institutional regime is to make
sure its policy effects are sufficiently diffuse such that the political opposition (the losers) will either be unwilling or find it too
costly to thwart the new regime once they come into power. A
plausible device for achieving this objective is to ensure the
new constitutional regime provides side-payments to certain
salient constituencies within the political opposition, even if the
political opposition would be unwilling to push for the regime
57
on its own. The new rule’s stability is an artifact of the opposition’s reluctance to seek revision once the rule is in place if doing so is likely to cause infighting among its core constituencies. For instance, in the postwar era, this divide-and-rule
strategy of partisan side-payments has been used to garner institutional stability for international trade commitments, such
58
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The
resulting structure of side-payments within NAFTA was such
that it mitigated the losing coalition’s willingness to thwart the
new regime, while simultaneously providing the winners with
net benefits.

57. There is a literature in political science that discusses the role of the
strategic side-payments to domestic groups in the context of negotiating international agreements, but that literature tends to focus on domestic factional
conflict defined broadly rather than the specific context of partisan conflict between an incumbent regime and the political opposition. See, e.g., Christina L.
Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 153 (2004) (arguing
that issue linkages in international trade agreements can “counteract[] domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes”); Frederick
W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The
Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT’L ORG. 793, 795 (1992) (analyzing the capacity of domestic factions to make side-payments to one another
in the context of an international negotiation and demonstrating that there is
a strategic dimension to these side-payments).
58. For a broader discussion of this point, see Jide Nzelibe, Strategic
Globalization: International Law as an Extension of Domestic Political Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 658–82 (2011).
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Of course, for the incumbents, the new institutional regime
may not be ideal, since the political opposition may sometimes
gain under the new regime at the expense of the enacting coalition. But the incumbents may be willing to sacrifice such costs
for the benefit of having a distributional regime that is sustainable across multiple electoral periods. Take, as an illustration, a constitutional regime that requires a legislative supermajority (as opposed to a simple majority) for any legislation
affecting state revenues. Such a rule will likely benefit business
constituencies that favor lower taxes at the expense of groups
that are net-beneficiaries of the status quo tax regime. The policy consequences of the new regime will not be completely
asymmetric; although the regime will make it more difficult to
raise taxes than under a simple majority rule, it will also make
it more difficult to repeal or lower taxes. However, provided
that the enacting coalition correctly calculates that a legislature will be more likely to face societal pressures to raise rather
than lower (or repeal) taxes, then the new rule will likely yield
net-benefits for that coalition. In other words, although the new
rule will sometimes constrain the policy choices of both sides, it
may—on average—tend to constrain more the policy choices of
the groups that are more likely to benefit from higher taxes.
Assuming the lack of radical asymmetry in policy outcomes
from a new rule, there are perhaps three other reasons why we
may expect incremental changes to the separation of powers to
exhibit moderate stability across multiple electoral periods.
First, other institutional actors or societal groups may have
preferences for maintaining the new status quo if it provides
other benefits which are divorced from partisan objectives.
Thus, for instance, presidents may embrace new arrangements
that facilitate legacy building objectives even when such ar59
rangements are disfavored by their co-partisans. As Stephen
Skowronek has observed, such conflicts may be unavoidable:
“Presidents act on American politics through personal struggles
to impose an authoritative definition on their respective historical situations. In so doing, they are continually undermining
60
the status quo ante.”

59. See JAMES CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVEL36–38 (1979) (discussing Woodrow Wilson’s view of the tension between partisanship and presidential leadership).
60. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP
FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 50 (1993).
OPMENT
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Second, and more importantly, the preferences of relevant
actors might change such as when partisan groups discover
that a formerly disfavored constitutional innovation can now
work to their advantage. For instance, Republican leaning constituencies consistently favored high tariffs in international
61
trade from the Civil War until the end of WWII. When Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934
(RTAA), which allowed the President to drastically slash tariffs
without congressional authorization, Republican leaders denounced it as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative au62
thority. The Republican Party platform of 1936 not only
63
vowed to repeal the RTAA, it also “condemn[ed] the secret negotiations of reciprocal trade treaties without public hearing or
64
legislative approval.” For decades prior to the 1940 election,
the Republican leaders in the Congress and Senate overwhelmingly voted for repeal of the RTAA every time it came up for re65
newal. By the late 1940s, however, when some of the Republican business constituencies that initially supported repeal
eventually became net exporters, a split emerged within Republican legislators and many decamped from their long-held
66
protectionist positions to embrace free trade. But this intracoalitional split within the Republican Party made it more likely that the constitutional innovations that made the RTAA possible would remain durable.
Third, courts might provide cover when they endorse one of
the competing partisan visions of the allocation of foreign af67
fairs powers. For instance, if the Supreme Court spells out a
61. See Douglas A. Irwin & Randall S. Kroszner, Interests, Institutions,
and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade
Liberalization After Smoot Hawley, 42 J.L. & ECON. 643, 644–46 (1999).
62. Id. at 650.
63. See Republican Party Platform of 1936, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(June 9, 1936), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29639#
ixzz1RR7G6ga4 (“We will repeal the present Reciprocal Trade Agreement
Law. It is futile and dangerous. Its effect on agriculture and industry has been
destructive. Its continuation would work to the detriment of the wage earner
and the farmer.”).
64. See id.
65. See Irwin & Kroszner, supra note 61, at 644–45.
66. See id. at 647 (“Senate Republicans voting in 1934 were responsive
only to import-competing interests, whereas those voting in 1945 were responsive to both import-competing and export-oriented interests.”).
67. The role of courts as tools for entrenching the preferences of societal
groups across multiple electoral periods has been a common theme in both the
law and economics and political science literatures. William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
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bright-line rule that eliminates any alternative interpretation,
such a doctrinal rule may become stable provided it is not radically at odds with the policy objectives of any of the major polit68
ical parties.
III. ILLUSTRATIONS OF PARTISAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT
This Part applies the distributional partisan framework to
two contexts in which there has been significant contention
over the scope of the Foreign Affairs Constitution: the pathway
for adopting human right commitments and war powers.
A. THE POLITICIZED PATHWAY TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITMENTS
Although debates regarding the pathways for adopting international human rights treaties and norms are often couched
in lofty normative terms, they often implicate more mundane
political considerations. With respect to the postwar controversies over human rights treaties and customary international
law, American partisan elites often served as agents of conflicting societal factions who sought to shift political decisionmaking to institutional spaces where they were likely to prevail
over their domestic political adversaries. Then, as now, these
conflicts were often not rooted in competing visions of American
foreign policy, but on the role such human rights treaties
should play in divisive conflicts over cultural issues and economic redistribution.

tive, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (discussing the entrenchment of interest
group preferences); see RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 50–99 (2004)
(discussing the entrenchment of threatened preferences of societal elites); Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–67 (2001) (discussing the entrenchment of partisan
objectives); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002) (same). More recently, scholars have also explored
how interpretive methodologies—which govern how courts decide cases—can
also be imbued with partisan objectives. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 690–96 (2009); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 559 (2006).
68. Of course, delegation to courts does not exhaust the options for societal actors seeking to entrench a policy preference. They may also delegate to
sympathetic administrative agencies. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999).
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Two kinds of conflicting parochial interests are likely to be
affected by human rights treaties when and if such treaties become enforceable by private parties in domestic courts. First,
and most significantly, human rights treaties might implicate
material interests because they often have the potential of redistributing economic goods among conflicting domestic groups.
For instance, United Nations human rights agreements, such
as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, espouse positive rights to a living wage, healthcare,
69
housing, and education, which ostensibly increase the material welfare of labor groups and other left-leaning coalitions at
the expense of landlords, industrial groups, and other capitalowning interests.
Second, human rights treaties also touch on what has
sometimes been termed the “redistributive” politics of morality
where “one segment of society attempts by government fiat to
70
impose their values on the rest of society.” In the United
States, for instance, the cluster of political issues that are addressed by many human rights treaties often mirror those affected by the so-called domestic culture wars, such as the appropriate definition of the family unit, capital punishment,
abortion, the role of women in society, family planning, and an71
tidiscrimination. Yet much of the literature often misses this
key element of the global debate over the politics of human
rights, often preferring to restrict the analysis of redistributive
conflicts to treaties on economic matters while treating the dif-

69. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which was submitted for signature years later, protected a range of positive
rights. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316, at 50–51 (Dec. 16, 1966); 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978);
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-1; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring
the right to a sufficient standard of living, including the right to health care).
70. KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN 4 (1994) (examining the morality politics of drug policy).
71. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 69; Convention on the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49, at 166 (Nov. 20, 1989); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46,
at 193 (Dec. 18, 1979).
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fusion of human rights as the product of the behavior of pro72
gressive norm entrepreneurs.
Thus, in contrast to the rosier vision of global society where
like-minded transnational groups exchange information and
resources to promote global objectives on which there is wide
73
consensus, this partisan framework assumes a political environment that is frequently characterized by contention between
societal groups on both sides of an issue trying to employ domestic and international institutions to tilt the political landscape in their favor. However, these value-laden conflicts are
not necessarily rooted in ideological disagreements about globalization per se, but in how human rights treaties help or hinder the ability of groups to promote other domestic political objectives.
Take, for instance, the post-WWII conflict between conservative and progressive leaning constituencies over the scope
of the treaty power. Fearing that the new U.N. treaties would
be used to push for New Deal economic as well as civil rights
policies, Republican Senators—led by Senator John Bricker of
Ohio—aligned with southern Democrats sought to introduce a
constitutional amendment that would make it more difficult to
74
ratify treaties that would be enforced by private parties. The
72. Admittedly, this skewed treatment of the politics of morality also extends the domestic politics literature. See MEIER, supra note 70, at 4 (citations
omitted) (“As such [morality politics] are a form of redistributive policy that is
rarely viewed as redistributive because the policies redistribute values rather
than income.”).
73. The literature on norm entrepreneurs in international human rights
is vast. See, e.g., See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 639−50
(2004); see also Roger P. Alford, The Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace Prize Laureates
as International Norm Entrepreneurs, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 61 (2008) (exploring
how Nobel Laureates have played an especially important role as preferencecreators in the development of international legal norms). For a good discussion of norm diffusion in an international legal context, see Katerina Linos,
How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?, 40
COMP. POL. STUD. 547, 564 (2007) (concluding that international organizations
are “powerful motors” to “reorient debate axes” in national human rights policies). But see Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 1, 1–2 (2007) (expressing skepticism about norm diffusion through international law).
74. The partisan dynamic underpinning the Bricker Amendment movement has been analyzed in detail elsewhere. See Nzelibe, supra note 58, at
658–74; see also Nzelibe, supra note note 6, at 426–29. However, this section
extends that previous analysis by examining the lack of mutual constraint
that underpinned the partisan conflict over the Bricker Amendment.
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ultimate objective of the Bricker Amendment was to overrule
the Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri v. Holland, which
seemed to suggest that the scope of the treaty power could be
75
broader than Congress’s power to pass regular legislation. The
1953 version of the amendment included language that, “[n]o
treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate
rights of citizens of the United States within the United
States . . . or any matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the
76
United States.” Ultimately, the Bricker Amendment was narrowly defeated in the wake of intense lobbying against it by
progressive groups and staunch opposition by President Eisenhower, who although he sympathized with Bricker’s policy concerns, was concerned that the reform would intervene too much
77
in executive branch authority in foreign affairs.
For business interests and professional groups aligned
with the Republican Party, the postwar U.N. human rights
agreements were viewed as facilitating the ascendance of a
global order that threatened to redefine the relationship be78
tween labor and owners of capital. Believing that such agreements could be used to as ploys for entrenching New Deal related objectives ranging from universal health care to an
international minimum wage, economic constituencies were
able to mobilize and find common ground in challenging what
they believed was an internationalist threat to their material
79
interests. Business constituents supporting the amendment
included the American Medical Association (opponents of uni-

75. 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920); see Nzelibe, supra note 58, at 660.
76. S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong. (1953); S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952).
77. See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 71 passim (1988).
78. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and
S.J. Res. 43 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 175 (1953) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Enid Griswold, V.P. of the Nat’l Econ. Council
of N.Y.) (decrying the domestic impact of “fantastic” proposals for social security, socialized medicine, and an international minimum wage by the International Labor Organization (ILO)); see also id. at 147 (statement of Frank Holman, former President, Am. Bar Ass’n.) (“But this is exactly what is now being
attempted by the modern ‘internationalists’ in the United Nations—to use
treaties to make domestic law—and they propose through the doctrine of Missouri against Holland ‘to make laws for the people of the United States in
their internal concerns,’ for as the State Department has officially said: ‘There
is no longer any real difference between domestic and foreign affairs.’” (citation omitted)).
79. Id. at 175.
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80

versal health care), the United States Chamber of Commerce
81
(opponents of the ILO conventions on labor), the National
Economic Council (same), and the Executive Committee of the
82
American Bar Association. Moreover, groups ideologically oriented with the right, such as the Daughters of the American
Revolution, Wheels of Progress, and the American Legion, also
supported the Bricker Amendment because they viewed the
U.N. human rights agreements as a threat to a particular vision of American moral values and social order, including the
83
contentious question of civil rights.
At first glance, the Bricker Amendment movement appeared to be an exercise in mutual constraint, for if the proponents had succeeded the effects of the new constitutional constraints would presumably be symmetrical. But upon further
examination, the Bricker Amendment was more likely intended
as a one-sided constraint. In other words, restricting the treaty
power was more likely an effort to bind progressive constituencies, while simultaneously preserving policy flexibility in institutional venues where conservative forces were more likely to
prevail against their political adversaries. Conservative groups
likely calculated that if political conflict on social issues and
economic redistribution took place primarily at the state level
in a federal structure, they had a better chance of pushing their
policy objectives and blocking some of the centralizing policy
84
goals of the New Deal coalition.
The upshot of this strategy is that on those foreign policy
issues favored by the right, constraining the treaty power under the Bricker Amendment would not have made much of a
80. Id. at 16 (statement of George F. Lull, Sec’y and Gen. Manager, Am.
Med. Ass’n).
81. Some of the rhetoric against the ILO conventions was quite alarmist
and possibly overblown. Take, for instance, the testimony of W.L. McGrath, a
Cincinnati businessman, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: “The
ILO is today, in my opinion, almost completely in the hands of a socialistic
government-labor coalition, which apparently has as its objective the enactment of socialistic legislation, standardized along ILO lines, in the largest possible number of countries in the world.” Id. at 536.
82. Id. at 129, 174; see Glendon Austin Schubert, Jr., Politics and the Constitution: The Bricker Amendment During 1953, 16 J. POL. 257, 271 n.52
(1954).
83. See Hearings, supra note 78, at 171 (statement of Mrs. James C. Lucas, Exec. Sec’y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution); id. at 19 (statement of Mrs.
Ernest W. Howard, Leg. Chairman, The Wheels of Progress); id. at 286–87
(statement of Ray Murphy, Chairman, Am. Legion Special Comm. on Covenant of Human Rights and U.N.).
84. See Nzelibe, supra note 58, at 658–74.
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difference. For instance, on an issue such as international trade
which was favored by southern constituencies as well as a
growing number of northeast Republican business interests, or
on global cooperation on transnational crime, there was already
other independent constitutional authority for Congress to
85
act. Thus, the executive branch authority to act in these issue
areas in foreign affairs would presumably not have been affect86
ed by the proposed amendment. In other areas, such as arms
reduction treaties or agreements governing military alliances,
the question of whether the treaty should be enforceable in do87
mestic courts was hardly an issue. And in other policy issues
where direct legal application was desired, Congress was already likely to pass implementing legislation.
But a puzzling aspect of this strategy is that conservative
forces in the early 1950s under the Eisenhower administration
were hardly a besieged minority that needed constitutional reform to protect their interests. On the contrary, they now had
an ally in the White House who opposed human rights trea88
ties.
If conservative groups in the early 1950s had more than
enough clout at the national level to block the ratification of
85. These subjects would fall presumably within Congress’s other independent constitutional powers to regulate foreign commerce and punish offenses against the law of nations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Other than making the scope of the treaty power largely the same as Congress’s domestic
legislative powers, and requiring implementing legislation before treaties
could be self-executing, the Bricker Amendment would presumably not affect
the rest of the foreign affairs powers listed above. See also Nzelibe, supra note
58, at 662–63 (describing the coalition of constituencies on international
trade).
86. For instance, a member of the ABA Standing Committee of Peace and
Law, testifying in favor of the Bricker Amendment, argued that it would not
affect the United States ability to enter into and give effect to treaties, such as
the Narcotics Convention. See Hearings, supra note 78, at 127–129 (statement
of Eberhard Deutsch, Am. Bar Ass’n); see also id. at 149 (statement of Frank
Holman, former President of the Am. Bar Ass’n) (“Some critics say . . . that
such an amendment would abridge the power of the United States to make
treaties of commerce, of navigation and of friendship and the power to make
other traditional types of treaties. This argument is fully disposed of in the
February 1952 report of the committee of law and peace . . . .” (referencing Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, 77
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 244 (1952))).
87. See generally id. at 120 (statement of Eberhard Deutsch, Am. Bar
Ass’n).
88. See, e.g., TANANBAUM, supra note 77, at 65 (noting that Eisenhower
was elected on a platform which “promised that international agreements
would not be allowed to jeopardize the rights of the American people”).
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any human rights treaty, why one might ask, did they also
need to seek a constitutional amendment? One likely answer is
that they anticipated that future Democratic administrations
might seek to use treaties instrumentally for redistributive policy objectives, and they sought to restrict the freedom of action
of their successors. There is evidence in the congressional testimony by groups in support of the Bricker Amendment to sug89
gest such considerations were at play.
Additionally, they may have been concerned that entrepreneurial judges might exploit favorable treaty language—even
in legally non-binding treaties—to advance a progressive agenda. These concerns were not entirely unfounded. Progressive
interest groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Lawyers Guild, the NAACP, and others were all
key participants in the first wave of human rights litigation in
the United States in the early postwar era, and they cited to
the U.N. Charter in briefs challenging restrictive covenants,
90
discrimination in education, transportation, and employment.
And in a legal and political climate where the precise legal status of treaties like the U.N. Charter was often the subject of
contentious legal debate, there was often room for creative interpretation by a friendly court. Some state court decisions, like
the California Supreme Court in the Sei Fujii case, favorably
alluded to the U.N. Charter in domestic civil rights disputes,
even though the Charter was not intended to be a legally bind91
ing document.
Ultimately, although postwar conservatives failed in their
quest to amend the Constitution, their efforts set in motion a
quasi-constitutional commitment that treaties should not be
used to address social issues that are primarily of local concern.
For instance, beyond enshrining this principle of treaty re-

89. See Hearings, supra note 78, at 641 (comment by Sen. Everett
Dirksen, Republican from Ill.) (“Speaking for myself, we think we would like to
lock the door before the horse gets out.”).
90. For an example of the litigations role of these interest groups, see Bert
B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights
Litigation: 1946–1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, app. at 950–56 (1984).
91. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619–22 (Cal. 1952). (“The humane and
enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to
respectful consideration by the courts and Legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for
peace and for equality of rights and opportunities.”). For a full discussion of
these federal and state cases, see Lockwood, supra note 90 passim.
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straint in State Department policy guidelines, the anti-treaty
movement also instigated the contemporary practice in the
United States of attaching reservations or declarations to human rights treaties to ensure that such treaties cannot be in93
voked by private parties in domestic litigation. Moreover, in
the mid-1950s, courts appeared to respond to the treaty backlash by retreating from the early postwar habit of citing favorably to the U.N. Charter and other treaties in domestic consti94
tutional controversies. In the 1956 case of Reid v. Covert, for
instance, the Supreme Court signaled a decisive end to this
postwar judicial practice when it declared in a plurality opinion
by Justice Hugo Black, “no agreement with a foreign nation can
confer power on the Congress, . . . which is free from the re95
straints of the Constitution.” Although Senator Bricker recognized that the Court’s decision in Reid would take away much
96
of the political wind out of his campaign, he nonetheless
vowed to continue in his efforts to seek a constitutional
amendment. But his defeat for reelection in 1958 formally end97
ed his quest.
In any event, the postwar conservatives’ anti-treaty discourse became politically durable for two distinct but interrelated reasons. First, and most obviously, determined opposition
by Republican constituencies and southern Democrats suggested that any constitutional innovation based upon using the
treaty power to sidestep federalist obstacles would have had a
short political shelf life. Second, and just as importantly, certain progressives came to view the strategy of domestic entrenchment through the treaty pathway as a political liability.
For these progressives, this institutional innovation of treaty
92. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future
of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1304
(2008) (quotations omitted) (“[A] set of guiding principles for international
lawmaking first written in the heat of the controversy in 1953 and still in effect in amended form today in the form of Circular 175 and the attendant regulations, echoes this commitment: treaties are not to ‘be used as a device to
circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are
essentially matters of domestic concern.’”).
93. See Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human
Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 341, 342–
48 (1995).
94. See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 110–11 (2004).
95. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
96. See TANANBAUM, supra note 77, at 213.
97. See id. at 215.
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entrenchment not only was a distraction, but it also ultimately
proved to be unnecessary because many of the same domestic
policy goals could be accomplished from an expansive reading
98
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, it is not implausible to
think that these progressives might have embraced the Court’s
decision in Reid for neutralizing a policy issue that had long
been a political boon for the political opposition. This latter
consideration suggests that political parties might come to endorse constitutional innovations that not only entrench those
issues they own that prove to be electoral assets, but that also
remove from the electoral agenda those owned issues that are
considered electoral liabilities.
Of course, the post-WWII conflict between conservatives
and progressives over human rights treaties has hardly ebbed,
as exemplified by recent strong partisan rancor over the wis99
dom of ratifying other modern human rights treaties. While
much of the academic commentary has focused on whether rati100
fication might be desirable from a foreign policy objective, it
has not sufficiently explored whether ratification is likely to
have distributional consequences for constituencies affiliated
with the Republican and Democratic parties.
However, there are three key reasons why one might continue to expect a left-right split on the question of domestic enforcement of international human rights treaties and norms.
First, Democrats are more likely to have their winning coalition
comprised of voters and interest groups who are sympathetic to
promoting social and economic rights across national bounda-

98. See KERSCH, supra note 94, at 111.
99. For instance, the 2008 Democratic platform endorsed the ratification
of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. See 2008 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
78283. By contrast, the 2008 Republican platform vowed to reject the ratification of both CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See 2008
Republican Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 1, 2008), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545.
100. See, e.g., JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 16–17 (2005) (arguing
against reliance on global governance norms which find favor in Europe); see
also John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 205, 206 (2000) (same). But see Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism, supra note 35, at 297–308 (discussing and criticizing conservative views on multilateralism).
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101

ries. Second, given the closer alignment between the views of
left leaning groups in the United States and European elites,
Democratic constituencies are likely to find more willing and
sympathetic transnational allies than their conservative adver102
saries. Third, the adoption and domestic enforcement of human rights treaties is more likely to elevate issues in which
Democrats have an electoral advantage over Republicans.
Democrats have an electoral advantage in economic redistribution, social welfare, and other socially progressive issues impli103
cating inter-group relations. Republicans, on the other hand,
have cultivated a better reputation for handling matters of national security, illicit drugs, crime, and so-called family-values
104
issues. Thus, all else equal, we may expect that Democratic
or left-leaning constituencies to be more sympathetic to reducing veto points or institutional barriers to ratifying and implementing human rights agreements, and right-leaning groups to
favor more constraints.
B. THE AMBIGUOUS AND CONTINGENT PARTISAN EFFECTS OF AN
EXPANSIVE WAR POWERS REGIME
Unlike the pathways for ratifying human rights agreements, the allocation of war powers authority seems to present
a much more ambiguous and complicated institutional landscape for partisan actors seeking to entrench their policy goals.
On the one hand, we may anticipate left-leaning parties to favor greater constraints on the executive branch in national security because they will have an incentive to shift resources
from the military towards those domestic issues in which they
have an advantage, such as social security, education, access to
105
health care, and welfare. Thus, we may expect left-leaning
groups to embrace institutional constraints that forestall the
kind of hawkish policy agenda that forces a tradeoff between
101. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights
Policy, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 (Michael
Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing conservative opposition to human rights treaties in the United States).
102. See id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
105. Michael T. Koch & Skyler Cranmer, Testing the “Dick Cheney” Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract More Terrorism than Governments of the Right?, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 311, 314 (2007); see
Glenn Palmer et al., What’s Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies, 30
INT’L INTERACTIONS 1, 7–8 (2004).
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butter and guns. On the other hand, executive branch flexibility may also lead to greater military expenditures and the
growth of a garrison state, which may tend to spur a redistributive politics where the rich or business interests bear a greater
share of the increasing tax burden from rearmament than la106
bor-leaning interests. Thus, we may anticipate right-leaning
parties, who are more aligned with business interests and other
groups opposed to progressive taxation, to disfavor greater executive branch flexibility in war powers.
The next three sections examine the conflicting partisan
preferences for executive branch flexibility for human rights
and war powers in the postwar era. Conservative resistance to
greater executive branch flexibility for ratifying human rights
agreements was consistent from the postwar era until the mod107
ern era. However, partisan preferences for greater flexibility
on war powers were much more contingent on background political factors, such as whether the rise in the national security
state was viewed as complementary or hostile to business or labor interests. I focus on two distinct time periods. First, I analyze the era immediately after WWII when President Truman’s
complementary politics of guns and butter triggered conservative opposition to executive branch primacy in war powers. I
then examine the post-Vietnam War era, when conservatives
and progressives started to switch their long-term positions on
the growth of the national security state. When President
Reagan came into power in 1980, he pursued a cleavage politics
of guns or butter that alienated progressives, but consolidated
conservative groups in favor of greater flexibility in war powers. Finally, the last section explores what seem to be exceptions to what a partisan model would predict: contemporary
Republican resistance to expansive war powers by Democratic
presidents.
1. How the Complementary Politics of Guns and Butter
Influenced War Powers in the Early Post-WWII Era
The Truman administration contributed to another constitutional innovation in foreign affairs which ultimately proved
to be the source of significant partisan contention. In 1950,
pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution but without
106. See Kevin Narizny, Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests
in the Political Economy of Rearmament, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 203, 203–05
(2003).
107. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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congressional authorization, President Truman ordered the deployment of American troops to intervene in hostilities in Korea. Although the Korean deployment ultimately proved to be a
108
political liability for Truman, commentators generally regard
it as a key turning point in the modern understanding of presidential war powers. As Louis Fisher put it, “President Harry
Truman’s commitment of U.S. troops to Korea in June 1950
still stands as the single most important precedent for the ex109
ecutive use of military force without congressional authority.”
Truman invoked both his commander-in-chief power as
well as United States treaty commitments to the United Nations as legal authority for the proposition that the President
could unilaterally commit troops to police actions approved by
110
the U.N. Security Council.
Whether treaty commitments
made under the U.N. Charter could ever serve as a substitute
for congressional authorization has been debated extensively in
111
the literature, but the Korean intervention has nonetheless
influenced much of the contemporary executive branch under112
standing of war powers. Truman’s actions have since been in108. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 88–89 (1995) (“Just as the
Vietnam War spelled defeat for the Democrats in 1968, so did the Korean War
help put an end to twenty years of Democratic control of the White House.”).
109. Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman
Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 21 (1995).
110. According to Truman:
Under the President’s constitutional powers as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces he has the authority to send troops anywhere in
the world . . . . This Government will continue to live up to its obligations under the United Nations, and its other treaty obligations, and
we will continue to send troops whenever it is necessary to uphold
those obligations.
Ted G. Carpenter, United States’ NATO Policy at the Crossroads: The ‘Great
Debate’ of 1950–1951, 8 INT’L HIST. REV. 389, 406 (1986) (quoting The President’s News Conference of January 11, 1951, 7 PUB. PAPERS 19 (Jan. 11,
1951)) (quotation marks omitted).
111. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 25, at 11 (suggesting the Korean deployment
was unconstitutional); Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis
Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 21–22 (1995) (same). But see David
Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Transformation
of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491, 1492, 1498–521 (1999)
(“[A]doption of the [U.N.] Charter . . . transformed the constitutional understanding of the war powers” in an internationalist sense that confirms “the
President’s unilateral power to use armed force in United Nations collective
security actions . . . .”).
112. As David Barron and Martin Lederman recently put it, “Truman took
a dramatic step forward in a history of unilateral presidential use of military
power, a development that had been building for over one hundred years, since
at least the Mexican War, in various contexts short of full-scale hostilities
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voked as legal precedent for unilateral presidential uses of force
in United Nations or NATO police actions by various administrations ranging from President Bush during the 1990 Iraq
deployment, to President Clinton in Bosnia and Haiti, to President Obama for the U.N. Security Council-authorized air
113
strikes in Libya.
How would the conventional accounts of constitutional
preferences explain the societal conflict over war powers in the
Korean crisis? Take, for instance, the institutional empirebuilding approach. In this picture, President Truman presumably did what we would expect of any modern president: he
sought to expand his policy flexibility during wartime and the
political opposition in Congress sought to constrain it. Once the
Republican opposition wins the White House, however, we
would expect the positions of the parties to be reversed.
Alternatively, one might evaluate Truman’s actions under
an ideational partisan approach. Republican constituencies,
presumably more hawkish than their Democratic counterparts,
would have eagerly embraced Truman’s quest for greater presidential flexibility to combat the growing communist threat.
Conversely, one would expect that progressive Democrats,
normally associated with dovish positions, would have been
more ambivalent about their co-partisan’s move to embrace an
expansive vision of war powers.
Both of these approaches seem appealingly simple and
parsimonious, but they are also largely inadequate. The ideational account of the postwar era does not work because conservative Republicans in Congress were overwhelmingly hostile
to Truman’s broad conception of war powers, while progressive
Democrats embraced it. The institutional empire building account does not shed much light earlier. While congressional
Republicans opposed flexible war powers and greater defense
spending under Truman, they also opposed it under Eisenhowagainst another nation’s armed forces.” David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb–A Constitutional History,
121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1056 (2008).
113. Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice 5–7 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum from Caroline D.
Krass], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-inlibya.pdf (arguing that the U.N. Security Council resolution expands the President’s war powers because the President has a responsibility to preserve the
Council’s credibility and to ensure that its edicts do not turn out to be “empty
words”).
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114

er. In sum, as the war party during the 1950s, the Democrats
appeared to favor the expansion of presidential war powers regardless of the administration in the White House, while Re115
publicans opposed it.
To a certain degree, however, the immediate legislative reaction to the Korean deployment did not suggest any obviously
116
deep partisan cleavages. But bipartisan support on both the
merits and constitutionality of the Korean deployment was
short-lived. Within a year after the war started, leading Republican Senators were roundly denouncing the intervention as
both unconstitutional and a partisan measure by warmonger117
ing Democrats.
“[T]he Democratic Party,” Senator Mundt
crowed in the 1951 Senate hearings, “since 1900 has never
118
failed to get us into every war that was around . . . .” And the
partisan backlash by these Republican Senators was hardly an
isolated case of political grandstanding. On the contrary, as observed by various commentators, conservative opposition to
Truman’s rearmament policies and increases in defense spend119
ing was both intense and sustained. And one key feature of
the national security state feared by conservatives was how the
expansion of presidential war authority could lead to the kinds
of unnecessary military engagements that drained the nation’s
treasury. In his 1951 testimony, for instance, Senator Mundt
criticized the purported “legal basis upon which the President
of the United States, acting on his own authority and without a
declaration of war by Congress, could plunge us into what has
already become the fourth most costly war in our Nation’s his120
tory.” Finally, conservatives also emphasized Congress’s superior democratic pedigree over the executive as a factor that
would make it less likely to endorse provocative or unnecessary
121
wars.
Conservative Republicans also feared that expansive war
powers could also lead to greater assertions of presidential au114. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON
GRAMS IN NATIONAL POLITICS 253–56 (1961).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PRO-

Id.
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 780–81 (1992).
97 CONG. REC. 5078–5103 (1951).
Id. 5089 (statement of Sen. Karl Mundt).
See MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945–1954, at 5–6 (1998);
HUNTINGTON, supra note 114, at 253–56.
120. 97 CONG. REC. 5078 (1951).
121. See Carpenter, supra note 110, at 407.
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thority in domestic policy issues. During the Great Debates
over American foreign policy that spanned from 1950 through
1951, for instance, Senator Taft warned: “If in the great field of
foreign policy the President has arbitrary and unlimited power,
as he now claims, then there is an end to freedom in the United
States in a great realm of domestic activity which affects, in the
122
long run, every person in the United States.”
These partisan divisions on both the President’s war powers and the growth of the national security state went beyond
mere support or antipathy to any particular occupant of the
White House. As Samuel Huntington observed regarding the
early Cold-War era, “party attitudes did not change with
changes in Administration. Throughout the fifteen years
[1945–60], the Democrats favored a higher level of military ef123
fort than did the Republicans.” Republican members of Congress, on the other hand, consistently favored lower levels of
military spending throughout the 1950s regardless of which
124
party occupied the White House. By contrast, during Eisenhower’s administration, congressional Democrats often attempted to increase the defense budget in explicit opposition to
125
the administration’s position. Facing pressures from his conservative flank to reduce taxes and defense spending, Eisenhower instituted budget cuts, but was swiftly condemned by
126
Democrats in Congress for endangering national security.
Eisenhower not only rejected Truman’s rearmament agenda, he also decisively repudiated Truman’s view of unilateral
127
presidential war powers. Beyond the constitutional concerns,
which he shared with his co-partisans in Congress, Eisenhower
argued that refusing to seek authorization from Congress on
128
decisions to use force was politically imprudent. He suggested
122. Geoffrey Matthews, Robert A. Taft, The Constitution and American
Foreign Policy, 1939–53, 17 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 507, 518 (1982) (quoting 97
CONG. REC. 2988 (1951)) (internal quotations omitted).
123. HUNTINGTON, supra note 114, at 253.
124. See id. at 253–62.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 260–61.
127. See DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 1953–1956, at
82 (1963); see also FISHER, supra note 108, at 103 (“Eisenhower . . . came to
realize that it was a serious mistake, politically and constitutionally, to commit the nation to war in Korea without congressional approval.”). Eisenhower
stressed that “[o]nly with [congressional] cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression.” Id. (quoting Special Message to the Congress
on the Situation in the Middle East, 6 PUB. PAPERS 11 (Jan. 5, 1957)).
128. See FISHER, supra note 108, at 103–04.
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that authorization not only reduced the domestic political risks
of military conflicts, it also signaled to foreign adversaries and
129
allies the collective resolve of the United States. In 1954,
when the question arose as to whether the United States would
intervene on France’s behalf in Indochina, Eisenhower reassured reporters that “there is going to be no involvement of
America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process
130
that is placed upon Congress to declare it.”
But why would Eisenhower and postwar Republicans consider expansive presidential war powers to be inconsistent with
their ideological and material interests? One answer is that the
plausible threat posed by the specific constitutional vision favored by Truman and the Democrats was not likely to be reciprocal across party lines. Truman’s constitutional argument was
that the U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing military
action in Korea was sufficient legal authority for his decision.
By ratifying the U.N. Charter and passing the U.N. Participation Act, Congress had presumably sanctioned the Korean deployment.
But a reciprocal threat by Republicans to engage in similar
expansive interpretations of the Constitution and the U.N.
Charter if they came into power would very likely not have
been a source of concern for progressive Democrats. Imagine,
for instance, how progressive Democrats would have reacted if
a conservative opponent of Truman’s Korean policies, such as
Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), made the following argument:
“You Democrats might think you have gotten your way today,
but consider how you would feel if a Republican President were
to come into power in 1953 and decide to embark on his preferred U.N. sanctioned wars without first seeking congressional
authorization?” The problem with such a threat would be threefold. First, it would not be particularly credible, since the Taft
wing of the Republican Party really did not care that much for
131
the United Nations. Second, the Democrats might actually
benefit from having the Republicans follow through on such a
threat since they probably wanted the Taft Republicans to buy
into the legitimacy of the United Nations. Third, for reasons
129. Id.
130. The President’s News Conference of March 10, 1954, 50 PUB. PAPERS
306 (Mar. 10, 1954).
131. See CLARENCE E. WUNDERLIN, ROBERT A. TAFT: IDEAS, TRADITION,
AND PARTY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 213–14 (2005) (explaining that close to the
end of his career Taft was in favor of abandoning the United Nations in favor
of a league of non-communist states).
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discussed in more detail below, as the “war party” of the 1950s,
the Democrats did not stand to lose much politically from a
more militaristic foreign policy, regardless of which party occupied the White House.
Republicans were also concerned that Truman’s vision of
war powers would lead to more expensive wars with redistributive tax consequences. As Kevin Narizny has pointed out, conservative business constituents during the early 1950s feared
that they would bear a disproportionate burden of any tax in132
creases associated with increased rearmament. Thus, given
the likely tax impacts, the postwar Republican Party was especially in favor of scaling back defense spending. The 1952 Republican Party Platform reflected this sentiment:
We shall always measure our foreign commitments so that they can
be borne without endangering the economic health or sound finances
of the United States. Stalin said that “the moment for the decisive
blow” would be when the free nations were isolated and were in a
state of “practical bankruptcy.” We shall not allow ourselves to be isolated and economically strangled, and we shall not let ourselves go
133
bankrupt.

Second, business interests were also worried that massive wartime borrowing could lead to inflation, which would in turn instigate political pressures for the government to impose the
kind of price controls which were considered a threat to free en134
terprise.
Third, and more importantly, conservatives feared that the
transformations wrought by Truman’s national security agenda
would lead to greater expansions of the federal government into
private and commercial spheres, justifying economic controls
135
and entrenching the regulatory objectives of the New Deal.
They worried that the centralizing tendencies of the national
security state would further erode the laissez faire system,
136
which favored reliance on market forces and private ordering.
On the international front, Republicans were also critical as to
whether Europeans were bearing their share of the weight in

132. See Narizny, supra note 106, at 215.
133. Republican Party Platform of 1952, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 7,
1952), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25837.
134. See HOGAN, supra note 119, at 289.
135. Id. at 290–91.
136. See id. at 8; see also id. at 115 (“No one worried more than Taft about
the dangers of the garrison state, which he saw as a large, national security
bureaucracy grafted on to the New Deal state and consuming resources that
properly belonged in the private sector.”).
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terms of resources and manpower in the Korean intervention.
While still associated with the Truman administration, as Supreme NATO Commander, Eisenhower embraced the Republican criticism that the growth of a national security state could
138
threaten domestic institutions. In early 1952, for instance, he
warned of “the danger of internal deterioration through the annual expenditure of unconscionable sums on a program of in139
definite duration, extending far into the future.”
Thus, postwar Republican business interests wedded to a
vision of a limited government might have reasonably conjectured that the Truman administration would have taken advantage of the Korea crisis and rearmament to strengthen the
Democratic Party’s policy agenda and further weaken Republi140
can efforts to roll back the New Deal. And there was already
some precedent in the 1950s that the presence of an external
threat could be used to transform or consolidate progressive so141
cial welfare reforms. As Michael Desch observes, “[w]ith the
exception of the Social Security Act of 1935, the most durable
increases in U.S. social welfare spending occurred not as a result of the continuation of New Deal social programs but as an
extension of wartime social welfare programs initiated during
142
World War II.”
Eisenhower immediately shifted gears on national security
once he entered the White House, favoring nuclear deterrence
143
as the preferred strategy for dealing with the Soviet threat.
He then cut the defense budget, abolished universal training,
and scaled back on aspects of national security that would re137. See Carpenter, supra note 110, at 401.
138. MEENEKSHI BOSE, SHAPING AND SIGNALING PRESIDENTIAL POLICY:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING OF EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY
20 (1998).
139. Id. (quoting a January 22, 1952 diary entry by Eisenhower).
140. See HOGAN, supra note 119, at 291 (“In conservative thinking, the big
budgets and big government of the Cold War were linked not only to national
security imperatives but also to the New Deal of the 1930s.”).
141. The notion that responses to national security crisis may prompt longterm institutional changes is central to the bellicist theory of state formation,
which not only argues that external threats stimulated the origins of the modern state, but that such threats increased the ability of the state to extract
taxes and project its authority. See CHARLES TILLY, Reflection on the History of
European State-Making, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN
EUROPE 32 (Charles Tilly ed. 1975).
142. Michael C. Desch, War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?, 50
INT’L ORG. 237, 252 (1996).
143. AARON L FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE:
AMERICA’S ANTI-STATISM AND ITS COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY 71 (2000).
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quire significant resources, such as building up conventional
144
troop levels. Despite his celebrated military career, Eisenhower constantly deemphasized the purely military aspect of
the Cold War, and seemed to embrace the notion that a healthy
and robust American economy would be one of the best foils for
145
the expansion of Soviet communism. The reduction of defense
expenditures was necessary, Eisenhower argued,
not because of any belief that we can afford relaxation of the combined effort to combat Soviet communism. On the contrary, it grows
out of a belief that our organized, effective resistance must be maintained over a long period of years and that this is possible only with a
146
healthy American economy.

The preferences of the postwar Republican Party on war
powers and national security were largely shaped by many of
the domestically oriented business interests that constituted its
core constituency. As the diplomatic historian Michael Hogan
contends, the postwar Republican coalition largely consisted of
“small producers and labor-intensive firms, that found it difficult to shoulder the tax burden required to sustain New Deal
social programs, a large military establishment, or expensive
147
foreign aid programs.” Antipathy by these business groups
towards both the role of government in economic affairs and increased tax burdens had been evolving steadily since the mid148
19th century. In his extensive review of American business
attitudes towards government, David Vogel writes: “Studies of
executive opinions from the Great Depression through the midsixties present a portrait both of business resentment toward
the New Deal and the unwillingness of executives in the post149
war period to abandon the ideal of a self-regulating market.”
And an analysis of speeches by business leaders from 1948–51
suggests that they were most concerned that the expenditures

144. Id.
145. SAKI DOCKRILL, EISENHOWER’S NEW-LOOK NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1953–61, at 30 (1996) (quoting Eisenhower’s Letter to Gruenther of May 4,
1953).
146. Id. (quoting Eisenhower to Gruenther, in The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953–1961).
147. HOGAN, supra note 119, at 6.
148. David Vogel, Why Business Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 45, 46 (1978).
149. Id.
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associated with the Korean War would lead to greater taxes
150
and inflation.
Both Truman’s national security agenda and his assertion
of expansive wartime powers during the Korean War were
151
largely welcomed by progressives. Democrats had come to be
known as the “war party” and they were willing to embrace an
understanding of executive powers that would counter the
152
growing anti-statist movement within the Republican Party.
In his memoirs, Secretary of State Acheson not only defended
Truman’s actions in Korea as constitutional, he also argued
that it was politically prudent for Truman to have avoided a
congressional resolution because the arduous process of doing
153
so could have “shaken [the] morale of the troops.” Moreover,
he rebuffed the view that a congressional resolution would have
softened political criticism if the war became unpopular; after
all, he insisted, “[c]ongressional approval did not soften or divert the antiwar critics of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Roo154
sevelt.” During the early stages of the Korean War, Democratic Senator Douglas of Illinois also mounted an elaborate
defense of the legality of the intervention on the floor of the
155
Senate.
Academic commentators also joined the fray. Writing in
the New York Times, Henry Steele Commager, a well-known
progressive historian, took Senator Taft to task for suggesting
that Truman’s actions were unprecedented and a threat to democracy: “[T]here is, in fact, no basis in our own history for the
156
distrust of the Executive authority.” Also in the New York
Times, prominent legal scholar Arthur Schlesinger, declared:
“Presidents have repeatedly committed American armed forces
abroad without prior Congressional consultation or approv-

150. See Clarence Lo, Theories of the State and Business Opposition to Increased Military Spending, 29 SOC. PROB. 424 (1982) (examining business opposition to U.S. national security expenditures between 1948 and 1953).
151. See DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 414–15 (1969) (chronicling the Korean War and shifting attitudes).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 415.
154. Id.
155. See RONALD J. CARIDI, THE KOREAN WAR AND AMERICAN POLITICS:
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS A CASE STUDY 46 (1968) (describing Senator Douglas’s defense).
156. Henry Steele Commager, Does the President Have Too Much Power?
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1951, at 172; see also Henry Steele Commager, Presidential Power: The Issue Analyzed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1951, § 6, at 11.
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157

al.” He then went on to accuse conservatives like Taft of distorting history and warned that past presidential actions would
stand as “obstacles to their efforts to foist off their current po158
litical prejudices as eternal American verities.”
The New Deal progressive coalition was composed of internationally minded businesses, trade union members, minorities, and reformers who were much more comfortable with an
active state role in the economy as well as strong international
159
institutions that would facilitate world peace. Of course, a
significant portion of this coalition also involved business interests, but they were more likely to be export oriented groups
that stood to benefit from closer security alliances with Europe
160
and the reconstruction efforts of the Marshall Plan. Together,
this coalition stood to gain from a more statist agenda that not
only embraced ambitious military overtures towards Europe
(which favored internationally oriented businesses), but also
from efforts to grow or consolidate New Deal social programs
161
(which benefited trade unions). To prosecute the Korean War
effectively, a coalition of trade unions and consumer groups endorsed the mobilization of United States military and economic
resources through more aggressive regulation and economic intervention, including wage controls, credit controls, price ceilings on agricultural products, rent controls, and regulation of
162
bank loans. Moreover, Truman also believed that expansion
of America’s national security capacity would complement the
163
goals of the welfare state. “To Truman’s way of thinking,”
Hogan observed, “national welfare and national security, do164
mestic and international programs, were inextricably linked.”
The economic interventions occasioned by the Korean War
157. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Presidential Powers: Taft Statement on Troops
Opposed, Actions of Past Presidents Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1951, at 28.
158. Id.
159. See HOGAN, supra note 119, at 5.
160. See Benjamin O. Fordham, Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in
Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy, 52 INT’L ORG. 359, 363–64 (1998); see
also Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure,
Party Competition, and American Public Policy During the Great Depression,
38 INT’L ORG. 41, 46 (1984) (stating that the center of the coalition consists of
capital-intensive industries, investment banks, and internationally oriented
commercial banks).
161. See, e.g., HOGAN, supra note 119, at 5–7 (discussing the make-up of
the coalition).
162. See id. at 350–51.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 173.
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would eventually trigger yet another constitutional controversy
with significant partisan overtones. After talks between the union of steel workers and steel mill owners collapsed over a wage
dispute in 1952, President Truman decided to take over the
165
mills under his Article II vested executive powers. In doing
so, Truman eschewed relying on his statutory authority to seek
166
to enjoin the unions from striking under the Taft Harley Act.
As Maeva Marcus’s thorough review of the Steel Seizure case
suggests, partisan politics was never far from the surface in
167
Truman’s decision. Truman had strong ties to the unions, especially after their support for his 1948 election and his own
earlier political attack on the Taft Harley Act, and he felt disinclined to invoke what he considered a labor unfriendly stat168
ute. The labor unions were elated with Truman’s decision.
“To rank and file union members,” Marcus observes, “Harry
169
Truman became a hero.” On the other hand, Republican Party leaders and business interests were apoplectic over the sei170
zure. “To permit this [act] to go unchallenged,” Senator William Knowland thundered before a huge GOP rally, “is to open
171
the door to the socialization of all of our principal industries.”
A meeting of business executives called by the United States
Chamber of Commerce and the American Association of Manufactures decried Truman’s action as a violation of the Bill of
172
Rights that would lead to “nationalization of all business.”
The steel mill owners sued the government and the Supreme
Court eventually struck the seizure down as a violation of the
173
separation of powers.
Unlike Truman’s decision to embark on the Korean War,
however, strong opposition to the steel seizure came also from
165. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
166. Id.
167. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 18–21, 76 (1977). For a concise and up-todate review of the Steel Seizure Case, see Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the
Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis Bradley eds., 2009).
168. See MARCUS, supra note 167, at 18.
169. Id. at 87.
170. Chester G. Hanson, Knowland Denounces Steel Seizure at Record Rally, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1952, at A1.
171. Id.
172. See Steel Seizure is Denounced: Business Executives Claim Bill of
Rights Violated, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 16, 1952.
173. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952).
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the progressive press. As Marcus observes, “even previous defenders of the President censured him for abusing the powers of
174
his office.”
The Nation magazine, for instance, denounced
Truman for “exaggerate[ing] the . . . ‘inherent powers’ with
175
which the Constitution has invested him.” One plausible explanation for the divergent reactions by the progressive press
to the two cases is that they might have perceived Truman’s
unilateral action in the seizure of the mills as relaxing an important constitutional constraint that could also protect Democratic constituencies under a future Republican administration.
Among the majority, Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion came
closest to recognizing Truman’s actions as having obvious reciprocal partisan implications:
Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a wage increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production. Yet tomorrow another President might use the same power to prevent a wage increase,
to curb trade-unionists, to regiment labor as oppressively as industry
176
thinks it has been regimented by this seizure.

2. Vietnam and the Partisan Switch on Presidential War
Powers
In the decades prior to the late 1960s, progressive Democrats continued to be supporters of greater militarization and
increases in defense budgets while conservative Republicans
177
were against these measures. In the wake of the Vietnam
War, however, both progressive Democrats and Republicans
started to revise their longstanding views on the merits of the
178
national security state. Indeed, there is now a growing literature that explores how the Vietnam experience redefined socie179
tal conflicts over the Cold War.
But did the shift in partisan preferences on national security extend beyond the specific military engagements to which
they were directly relevant, changing preferences for presidential war powers as well? While there has been some research
174. MARCUS, supra note 167, at 89.
175. Id. (quoting THE NATION, Apr. 1952, at 393).
176. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 633–34.
177. See generally Benjamin Fordham, The Evolution of Republican and
Democratic Positions on Cold War Military Spending, 31 SOC. SC. HIST. 603
(2007) (describing evolving attitudes toward the Cold War).
178. Id.
179. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF
LYNDON JOHNSON 535–37 (1996) (describing attitudes regarding the Vietnam
experience). See generally Fordham, supra note 177, at 603.
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done on the evolution of partisan preferences for military
180
spending since the late 1960s, there has been little or no research done on how the shifts in constituent interests influenced partisan preferences for constraints on presidential authority. Instead, much of the literature assumes divergent
preferences about presidential war powers are mostly motivated by ideas and beliefs about how particular institutions best
promote American national security objectives. I suggest that
both the Vietnam War and Reagan’s military policies in the
1980s prompted certain changes that altered the relative
strength and material interests of constituents affiliated with
the Republican and Democratic Parties, which in turn affected
how these groups viewed the appropriate balance of war powers
181
between the President and Congress.
So why did progressive Democratic constituencies abandon
their postwar stance on the merits of Cold War military spending and the growth of the national security state? Furthermore,
why did postwar Republican constituencies, who bemoaned the
statist implications of militarization in the 1950s, start to
switch their views in the 1960s? One plausible account has emphasized the spread of post-materialist cultural beliefs among
182
progressive groups during that period. Other accounts emphasize how the distributional implications of the national se183
curity state started to change as the war evolved. In the face
of the economic downturn in the late 1960s, for instance, key
progressive Democrats seemed to perceive a growing defense
budget as actually exerting a crowd out effect on other domestic
priorities that were key planks of Johnson’s “Great Society”
agenda.
This evolution of progressive views of a tradeoff between
180. See Fordham, supra note 177, at 604–07.
181. To be clear, however, the political and institutional repercussions of
the Vietnam War often transcended partisan lines. The United State’s humbling experience during that war contributed to growing public weariness of
cold-war military adventurism as well as a desire to constrain presidential
war authority. When the War Powers Resolution passed in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto, for instance, it commanded the support of bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress. But one factor that is not sufficiently
acknowledged in the literature is how the escalation of cold war military engagements during this period transformed the relative strength and makeup
of the constituencies of both political parties.
182. See RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 298 (1990) (“Opposition to the War became a major Postmaterialist
cause, linked with humanitarian (rather than economic) concerns. . . .”).
183. See Fordham, supra note 177, at 622–27.

2013]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION

885

butter and gun was gradual but nonetheless significant. Early
in the American involvement in the Vietnam War, for instance,
President Johnson was still willing to echo the conventional
view of a complementary relationship: “I believe we can do
both. We are a country that was built by pioneers that had a rifle in one hand and an axe in the other. We are a nation with
the highest GNP, the highest wages, and most people at work.
184
We can do both.” The platform of the Democratic Party in
1972, by contrast, reflected the emerging progressive consensus
that there was a tradeoff:
[M]ilitary defense cannot be treated in isolation from other vital national concerns. Spending for military purposes is greater by far than
federal spending for education, housing, environmental protection,
unemployment insurance, or welfare. Unneeded dollars for the military at once add to the tax burden and pre-empt funds from programs
185
of direct and immediate benefit to our people.

In hindsight, the ensuing political and economic fallout of
the Vietnam War seemed to confirm the worst fears of progressive skeptics. As one commentator wryly observed, “[o]ne may
speculate over what might have been if the country had remained at peace . . . . This might have launched a long period of
Democratic control of the White House and the Congress. The
Great Society would have survived and might have been ex186
panded.” For Republicans, on the other hand, the effects of
the military buildup during the Vietnam War did not result in
the same kind of economic interventionist policies that accom187
panied Truman’s efforts in Korea. Indeed, hawkish Republicans, such as Senator Goldwater of Arizona, often boasted of
their support for Johnson’s war effort, even as support by John188
son’s fellow Democrats in Congress started to wane. Ulti184. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 526.
185. Democratic Party Platform of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July
10, 1972), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29605.
186. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 537.
187. See Fordham, supra note 177, at 624 (showing that military spending
in the Vietnam War posed a smaller inflation risk than in the Korean War,
and therefore required less regulation and lower tax rates); cf. David E. Kaun,
War and Wall Street: The Impact of Military Conflict on Investor Attitudes, 14
CAMB. J. ECON. 439, 451 (1990) (contrasting the reactions of investors during
the Korean War to those during the Vietnam War).
188. In a letter to a newspaper, Goldwater boasted, “I have probably been
more active in the support of Johnson’s policies in Vietnam as he is now conducting them than have most Democrats.” Andrew L. Johns, Doves among
Hawks: Republican Opposition to the Vietnam War, 1964–68, 31 PEACE &
CHANGE 585, 595 (2006) (quoting a March 31, 1967 Letter to the Editor by
Senator Barry Goldwater published in the Louisville Courier Journal).
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mately, Republicans were able to view the prosecution of that
conflict as consistent with their staunch anticommunist proclivities without having to worry about any negative economic ef189
fects it might have on their key business constituencies.
Reagan’s victory in 1980 cemented the switch in Republican and Democratic preferences on militarization. Prior to his
election, the question of a tradeoff between guns and butter had
190
been largely a matter of conjecture. When Reagan came into
power, however, he embraced an agenda that would make such
a tradeoff explicit. Advocating a supply side theory that lower
taxes could spur higher revenues, Reagan pushed for the most
significant defense budget increases since the Korean War,
while simultaneously embarking on a fiscal agenda of lower
191
taxes and cuts in civilian spending on domestic programs.
Since the revenue boost expected by lowering taxes did not
quite transpire, Reagan’s initiative essentially evolved into a
gambit to scale back the New Deal welfare state by starving
192
it. Subsequent empirical studies have shown that the Reagan
administration departed significantly from the budget priorities of his predecessors, and used defense spending to crowd out
the kind of domestic social spending favored by Democratic
193
constituencies. As the presidential scholar Wildavsky acutely
observed, “[d]efense policy became domestic policy in that more
189. To be sure, the Republicans were not overwhelmingly in support of
Johnson’s war, especially as the toll of the conflict mounted over the late 1960s
and American public started to show signs of weariness with the conflict. See
Johns, supra note 188, at 595 (exploring the blurring of partisan lines during
the growth of congressional sentiment against the Vietnam War).
190. See Bruce Russett, Defense Spending and National Well-Being, 76 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 767, 776 (1982) (noting that expenditures for education and
health largely rose through both the Korean and Vietnam wars).
191. See id.
192. Some commentators have suggested that this approach was part of an
overall fiscal strategy by the Reagan administration. See Jack A. Meyer, Social
Programs and Social Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE REAGAN YEARS 65, 70–
72 (John L. Palmer ed., 1986). But see Mark S. Kamlet et al., Upsetting National Priorities? The Reagan Administration’s Budgetary Strategy, 82 AM.
POL. SC. REV. 1293, 1304 (1988) (“[A]lthough the Reagan administration has
had a major impact on the composition of the budget, the strategy of ‘starving
the budget’ through tax cuts has been a mixed success at best.”).
193. See Russett, supra note 190, at 776 (citation omitted) (“The current
Republican president, sensing widespread public support for military expenditures, has imposed trade-offs between military and federal civil spending.”);
see also Alex Mintz, Guns Versus Butter: A Disaggregated Analysis, 83 AM.
POL. SC. REV. 1285, 1292 (1989) (showing the existence of trade-offs between
investments in the development and production of weapons systems and
spending on education).
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for defense became less for domestic, mostly welfare pro194
grams.”
But the existence of a perceived tradeoff between guns and
butter was not the only factor that shaped the shift in partisan
preferences for national security. Changes in the composition of
constituent interests of the parties likely played a role as well.
Internationally oriented business interests, which had once
been a core part of the New Deal coalition that supported
greater defense spending in the postwar era, had been drifting
slowly to the Republican Party since the 1960s as the GOP so195
lidified its new identity as the party of “free trade.” By the
early 1970s, McGovern’s rhetoric had largely scared even “progressive” multinationals away from the Democratic Party, making Democrats in the 1980 election even more reliant on contributions from trade union constituencies who favored a retreat
196
from postwar internationalism. Another crucial development
was the shift of the Republican Party’s regional base of support
to the South and West, which had historically been a strong197
hold of Cold War internationalism. More importantly, however, this region also stood to gain the most materially from
Reagan’s new budget priorities. As Peter Trubowitz has observed, “[t]he main beneficiaries . . . measured in terms of gains
in industrial employment from the Reagan [military] buildup,
were concentrated in the sunbelt, particularly in the South and
198
West.” The support base of the Democratic Party, on the other hand, was shifting towards the Northeast, which bore the
194. AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
380 (1988).
195. See William R. Keech & Kyoungsan Pak, Partisanship, Institutions,
and Change in American Trade Politics, 57 J. POL. 1130, 1131–33 (1995) (discussing the evolution of the Republican Party’s platform from protectionism to
free trade).
196. What little financial support Democrats could expect from internationally oriented multinationals dwindled significantly during the late 1970s,
as these business groups threw their support behind Reagan’s candidacy in
1980. See THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF
THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 76 (1986) (discussing how McGovern’s “openness to progressive redistribution” lost him the support of most American businesses); cf. Michael Hout et al., Classes, Unions
and the Realignment of U.S. Presidential Voting, 1952–1992, in THE END OF
CLASS POLITICS? CLASS VOTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 83 (Geoffrey
Evans ed., 1999) (examining the Republican Party’s successful tactic of focusing on the individual self-interest of voters).
197. TRUBOWITZ, supra note 38, at 225 (discussing “the Nixon administration’s desire to create political patronage in the South and West”).
198. Id. at 225–26.
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199

fiscal brunt of Reagan’s military buildup.
As the parties’ views of the relative benefits of militarization for their constituents started to change, so did their views
of presidential war powers. To be clear, however, the initial institutional repercussions of the Vietnam War seemed to transcend partisan lines. In addition to the military debacle in Indochina, Nixon’s Watergate scandal had soured the public mood
in the early 1970s on both Cold War military adventurism and
expansive presidential authority. When the War Powers Resolution (WPR) passed in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto, for
instance, it commanded the support of bipartisan majorities in
200
both houses of Congress. Ostensibly, the WPR was designed
to provide a framework for collective judgment by both branches before United States troops are deployed into combat, espe201
cially for lengthy military engagements. Since its passage,
however, the WPR has been criticized intensely for both its
awkward language and purported loopholes that make it easy
for presidents to evade its reporting and consultation require202
ments. But one factor that is not sufficiently acknowledged in
the literature is how the parties have adopted distinct and conflicting positions about how best to reform or revise the WPR.
For the most part, Republican legislative efforts to amend
the WPR have focused on either weakening or repealing it altogether, whereas Democrats have sought to strengthen it. More
importantly, however, Republican members of Congress have
often invoked as a rationale for reforming the WPR that it has
encouraged legislative interference with the President’s war
powers. Take, for instance, the contentious debates surrounding Republican Congressman Henry Hyde’s efforts to introduce
a measure to repeal the WPR in 1995. This measure was
championed by conservative Republicans when President Bill
199. See id. at 228 (“When lawmakers from the Northeast argued that the
rearmament program was excessive and wasteful and proposed defense cutbacks, they were appealing to constituents in an era of sluggish growth in the
region’s big urban states.”).
200. FISHER, supra note 108, at 130.
201. See id. at 128–33 (discussing the goals of the WPR).
202. See ELY, supra note 25, at 115–31 (suggesting that the War Powers
Resolution was poorly drafted and suggesting changes in language that would
force the President to seek congressional authorization before going to war);
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 189–93 (1996) (suggesting that a
stronger framework statute that encourages Congress to be more active in war
powers would serve as a check on tyranny and discourage overreaching by the
executive branch).
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Clinton, a Democrat, occupied the White House. In introducing
his amendment, Hyde was explicit that he viewed the WPR as
an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s war authority, but he also condemned the 1973 legislation for “embolden[ing] our adversaries while hamstringing the President
203
when he most urgently needs the authority . . . to act.”
Milking the apparent irony of this Republican measure for
all its worth, House Speaker Newt Gingrich threw his weight
behind it and cajoled his colleagues, “I rise for what some
Members might find an unusual moment, an appeal to the
House to, at least on paper, increase the power of President
Clinton . . . . [T]he American nation needs to understand that
as Speaker of the House and as the chief spokesman in the
House for the Republican party, I want to strengthen the current Democratic president because he is the President of the
204
United States.”
Among House Democrats, however, the
amendment was denounced as a dangerous measure that would
spur riskier presidential war initiatives that lacked public sup205
port. House Republicans voted—by a lop-sided margin of 178
206
to 44—to support the amendment. That was not enough to
win a majority, however, as an overwhelming number of House
Democrats combined with some wavering Republicans to vote
207
against it. In hindsight, Gingrich acknowledged that some of
his Republican colleagues who might have supported the repeal
of the WPR in principle eventually decided to vote against it
208
because they did not want to appear to be supporting Clinton.
But the House Speaker admitted to being particularly surprised and disappointed that President Clinton himself did not
203. 141 CONG. REC. H5656 (1995) (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
204. 141 CONG. REC. H5672–73 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (emphasis added).
205. For instance, Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.), testifying in
opposition to the amendment, warned:
I think the War Powers Act has had an effect, and I think with the
demise of the cold war I do not see any reason that we cannot work
out a better way to maybe make this better, to maybe make it more
efficient, but I am not sure that we need to do it in a haste right now
where we just withdraw as members of Congress . . . .
141 CONG. REC. H5657 (1995) (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
206. See 141 CONG. REC. 15, 209–10 (1995).
207. Overall, the House voted 217 to 201 not to repeal the WPR, with
House Democrats voting 172 to 23 against. Id.
208. See Katharine Q. Seelye, House Defeats Bid to Repeal ‘War Powers,’
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/08/world/housedefeats-bid-to-repeal-war-powers.html (detailing Mr. Gingrich’s and Mr.
Hyde’s attempts to gather Republican support for the repeal).
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seem to evince any obvious enthusiasm for Hyde’s amend209
ment.
During Clinton’s presidency, such unsolicited Republican
efforts to repeal the WPR and expand presidential war powers
were hardly isolated. In the Senate, Robert Dole, the 1996 Republican presidential candidate, also proposed repealing the
WPR in 1995 and replacing it with another framework statute
which in his words would “untie the president’s hands in using
210
American forces to defend American interests.” Republican
legislative leaders, including Senator Dole and House Speaker
Gingrich, also threw their support behind Clinton’s 1995 deci211
sion to intervene in Bosnia, and often prodded the administration to take a much more aggressive stance against the
212
Serbs. Bucking criticism from some Republican rank and file
members, Senator Dole went so far to propose drafting a resolution that would have provided bipartisan support for the
Bosnia mission in 1995 in the wake of a proposed peace agree213
ment later that year.
When viewed though a partisan prism, the decision by Republican leaders to boost presidential war powers during Clinton’s presidency is not that surprising. Despite House Speaker
Gingrich’s high-minded rhetoric during the debates on the
Hyde Amendment, Republican legislators were not necessarily
being altruistic. Implicitly, the congressional Republicans were
likely building the institutional foundation for a future when
they expected their co-partisan to win back the presidency. And
the Republican chance of legislative success in pushing this innovation was probably more likely when a Democrat was in the
White House since they would at least be able to pick up the
support of some congressional Democrats who would have been
less keen to repeal the WPR during a Republican presidency.
Also, from the perspective of voters, Hyde’s proposed amendment seemed less electorally self-serving than it would have
been if his co-partisan occupied the White House. In this vein,
the Republicans were likely exploiting the political opportunity
that might arise from a “Nixon Goes to China” logic. As Robert
209. See id.
210. Robert Dole, We Will Continue in Our Drive to Return Power to Our
States and Our People, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A10.
211. See Elaine Sciolino, Dole Backs Plan to Send U.S. Forces on Bosnia
Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at A1.
212. See Steven Greenhouse, Gingrich is Urging a Tougher Policy on Bosnia’s Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at A1.
213. See Sciolino, supra note 211, at A1.
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Goodin has suggested in explaining this logic, “[i]f an action is
somehow out of character for a particular politician, then, for
that very reason there are fewer external obstacles to that poli214
tician’s performing it.”
In any event, in the wake of Vietnam, Democrats started
advocating greater constraints on the President’s war powers.
In the 1972 platform, the Democratic Party asserted the need
to “[r]eturn to Congress, and to the people, a meaningful role in
215
decisions on peace and war,” and four years later, after the
Watergate incident, it again pledged that “Congress will be involved in the major international decisions of our government,
and our foreign policies will be openly and consistently pre216
sented to the American people.” The Democrats did not necessarily launch a frontal attack on all presidential war decisions during this period but were much more sanguine than the
Republicans that the WPR could constrain the executive
branch’s decisions to use force. In their 1984 platform, for instance, the Democrats declared: “In the face of the Reagan Administration’s cavalier approach to the use of military force
around the world, the Democratic Party affirms its commitment to the selective, judicious use of American military power
in consonance with Constitutional principles and reinforced by
217
the War Powers Act.” Subsequent platforms in 1988 and 2008
called for either a greater role for Congress or more respect for
constitutional constraints on presidential decisions during war218
time. And during the Clinton administration, congressional
Democrats shied away from supporting Republican proposals to
weaken the WPR. On the contrary, leading Senate Democrats
214. Robert E. Goodin, Voting Through the Looking Glass, 77 AMER. POL.
SCI. REV. 420, 421 (1983).
215. Democratic Party Platform of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July
10, 1972), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29605.
216. Democratic Party Platform of 1976, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July
12, 1976), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29606.
217. See Democratic Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 16, 1984), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29608.
218. See Democratic Party Platform of 1998, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 18, 1998), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29609 (“WE BELIEVE
in a clear-headed, tough-minded, decisive American foreign policy that . . . reflects our values and the support of our people, a foreign policy that will respect our Constitution, our Congress and our traditional democratic principles
and will in turn be respected for its quiet strength.”); see Democratic Party
Platform of 2008, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283 (“We reject sweeping claims of
‘inherent’ presidential power . . . . We believe that our Constitution, our courts,
our institutions, and our traditions work.”).
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actually entertained a proposal in 1993 that would have
amended the WPR in a manner that would further circumscribe President Clinton’s war authority, even though the Clinton administration was embroiled at the time in troop deploy219
ments in both Haiti and Somalia.
The policy consequences of greater constraints on the executive branch’s war powers were largely consistent with the
views of post-Vietnam progressive regime. By 1973, the progressive historian Arthur Schlesinger, having previously denounced Senator Taft for distorting the history of presidential
war powers in 1951, issued a mea culpa. He admitted that in
labeling Senator Taft’s position on Korea “demonstrably irre220
sponsible,” he had engaged in “a flourish of historical docu221
mentation and, alas, hyperbole . . . .” Schlesinger was keenly
aware that the Vietnam War had seriously compromised the
political landscape for many of the key programmatic goals of
the postwar Democratic Party. “[T]he Great Society,” he de222
clared in 1966, “is now, except for token gestures, dead.” In
congressional testimony in 1971, Commager also retracted his
earlier support for robust presidential war powers and ap223
pealed for a greater legislative role in decisions to use force.
But expanded presidential war powers not only seemed
discordant with the policy and constitutional views of progressive elites, it also threatened to strengthen the electoral objectives of Republicans at the expense of Democrats. In the modern era, for instance, the constituencies of both parties tend to
reward and punish presidential decisions to use force differently. Democratic voters and constituencies appear more willing to
sanction their co-partisan in the White House for military fail224
ure or stalemate. By contrast, right leaning constituencies
219. Adam Clymer, Democrats Study Amending War Powers Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 5N.
220. Schlesinger, supra note 157, at 28.
221. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 139 (1973).
222. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF HOPE AND THE BITTER
HERITAGE: AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S at 432 (2008).
223. War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7–74 (1971). And the celebrated constitutional law professor John Hart Ely also argued that a significant portion of
the war in Indochina, most especially Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia,
was in fact unconstitutional. See John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990).
224. See Dennis M. Foster & Glenn Palmer, Presidents, Public Opinion,
and Diversionary Behavior: The Role of Partisan Support Reconsidered, 2
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appear more willing to forgive bad military outcomes and re225
ward successful ones during Republican presidencies.
Given the acute political sensitivity of presidential military
decisions, courts have been understandably reluctant to get in226
volved in war powers controversies. Nonetheless, prominent
progressive commentators, interest groups, and judges have
tended to be sympathetic to a more active judicial role. The
constitutional scholar John Hart Ely has suggested that courts
might be one of the only institutions politically capable of
227
checking presidential usurpation of Congress’s war authority.
He urged judges to abandon the “‘justiciability’ doctrines sometimes interposed in these situations” given that “Congress will
seldom have either the incentive or the moral standing to do
228
anything about an unconstitutional war.”
In the wake of
Reagan’s Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, another leading
liberal scholar, warned: “[J]udges retain a duty in the postIran-contra era to ensure that in the field of foreign affairs, legal authority does not become permanently uncoupled from le229
gal constraint.”
When plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of both the
Vietnam War and other post-Vietnam uses of force, liberal
leaning judges sometimes suggested that they would be willing
to consider such challenges on the merits under the right cir230
cumstances. More broadly, liberal interest groups such as the
FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 269, 275 (2006) (noting that Republican presidents
see a larger surge in popularity following the use of force than Democratic
presidents); see also Benjamin Fordham, Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy
and the U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 418, 422 (1998)
(exploring the attractiveness of “diversionary” uses of force by a president to
combat poor economic performance).
225. See Foster & Palmer, supra note 224, at 275 (2006); see also Michael
T. Koch & Patrick Sullivan, Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship,
Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions,
72 J. POL. 616, 617 (2010) (“[R]ight party executives become less likely to terminate military interventions as their popularity declines.”).
226. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has
served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety . . . . And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of
dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.”).
227. See Ely, supra note 223, at 1135.
228. See id.; but see FISHER, supra note 108, at 199 (“Each branch must
protect its own territory. Congress cannot go to the courts, hat in hand, asking
judges to do what legislators are fully capable of doing: Check the President.”).
229. KOH, supra note 202, at 184.
230. In Mitchell v. Laird, for instance, Judges Bazelon and Wyzanski ob-
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Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and the New York Civil
Liberties Union have been quite active in bringing cases chal231
lenging presidential war powers since the early 1970s, and
the National Lawyers Guild—another prominent liberal advocacy group—even opened an office in the Philippines to represent American soldiers who were charged with being AWOL
232
(absent without leave) during the Vietnam War.
Consistent with a partisan logic of issue ownership, there
is some anecdotal evidence that liberal judges may be less willing to defer to the executive branch’s exercise of war powers
233
even when a Democrat occupies the White House. By contrast, conservative judges seem to be more open to deferring to
presidential judgment during wartime regardless of the party
affiliation of the President. For instance, in the 1995 case of
Campbell v. Clinton, D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel, a Clinton
appointee, distanced himself from Judge Laurence Silberman’s
concurring opinion that President Clinton’s authorization of air
strikes in Kosovo without congressional authorization was a
234
non-justiciable political question. While agreeing with Judge
Silberman, a conservative Reagan appointee, that the congressional plaintiffs lacked standing, he opined that if the right
served that the Vietnam War could be unconstitutional, despite Congress’s
continued funding of the war, although they found the limits of the President’s
duty to be only bad faith and held that there was no evidence available by
which a court could assess that issue. 488 F.2d 611, 614–15 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
David Bazelon was a Truman appointee to the D.C. Circuit and Charles
Wyzanski, a Roosevelt appointee, was a Senior Judge from the District of
Massachusetts who was sitting by designation on the D.C. Circuit. See GREAT
AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 39 (John R. Vile ed., 2003); BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FED. JUDGES, http://www.fcj.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=
2669&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). Judge
George MacKinnon, a Nixon Appointee to the D.C. Circuit, wrote a separate
opinion to disagree with the view by Wyzanski and Bazelon that Congress’s
appropriations and other legislation was not sufficient to constitute consent to
the war in Indochina. Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 617–18 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Also, in Crockett v. Reagan, Judge Joyce Green, a liberal Carter appointee, ruled that if the United States is involved in a major military conflict, a
court could enforce the War Powers Resolution, at least to the extent of ordering the President to report to Congress. 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982).
231. See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1393–411 (1995) (describing the CCR’s role in challenging war decisions during the Reagan administration).
232. See Patricia G. Barnes, A Lawyer Group with a Mission: Guild Tries to
Buck Communist Label, Conservative Tide, 81 A.B.A. J. at 23 (July 1995).
233. See, e.g., Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
234. 203 F.3d 19, 37–39 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (discussing
the competency and constitutionality of courts determining the existence of a
war).
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plaintiffs came along there should be no barrier to judicial re235
view.
More recently, Judge Janice Rogers Brown, a conservative
Bush appointee to the D.C. Circuit, expressed strong reservations as to whether the international laws of war could con236
strain President Obama’s war powers. “[W]hile the international laws of war are helpful to courts when identifying the
general set of war powers to which the [Authorization to Use
Military Force] speaks,” she observed, “their lack of controlling
legal force and firm definition render their use both inapposite
and inadvisable when courts seek to determine the limits of the
237
President’s war powers.” Ironically, the Obama administration went out of its way to object to Judge Brown’s opinion, arguing that the administration could prevail under a narrower
238
legal standard.
Of course, these judicial decisions are merely anecdotal and
may not be sufficient to warrant making generalizations about
partisan judicial behavior during wartime. Nonetheless, the
goal here is not to suggest such judicial decisions are pervasive,
but that they occur with enough frequency to be of theoretical
interest.
Despite partisan differences over constraints on the President’s use of force decisions, the trajectory of presidential war
239
powers has remained relatively stable in the postwar era.
This stability is partially an artifact of the fact that the President, the institutional actor who has both the power and ability
to reverse this trajectory, is the one who benefits from it the
240
most. But presidential empire building cannot be a sufficient
235. Id. at 37.
236. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Subsequently,
a majority of active judges on the D.C. Circuit declared that the rejection of
international law was dictum. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
237. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871.
238. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d at 3 (Brown, J., concurring) (noting
“the government’s eager concession that international law does in fact limit
the [Authorization for Use of Military Force] . . .”).
239. See FISHER, supra note 108, at 185 (arguing that the trajectory of war
powers in the postwar era has been unmistakably from Congress towards the
President).
240. See MARIE T. HENEHAN, FOREIGN POLICY AND CONGRESS: AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE 8–11 (2000) (citing several studies showing
that the President is stronger in foreign affairs because he initiates policy and
has an executive advantage in informational resources and technical expertise).
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explanation for the durability of the postwar regime of war
powers. The partisan composition of Congress likely plays a
role as well. When the political costs of a particular military
stalemate are high enough, and Democrats (or the dovish party) have decisive majorities in both houses, we may expect
241
Congress to marshal the political will to turn the tide. But as
long as members of Congress from the hawkish party sense
that flexible presidential war powers may deliver greater benefits to their core constituencies at the expense of the political
opposition, it will prove difficult to garner the requisite bicameral congressional majorities necessary to implement meaningful and enduring constraints on presidential war powers.
3. A Caveat: Republican Opposition to Wars by Democratic
Presidents
One important caveat to this analysis is that the partisan
response to military initiatives by Democratic presidents has
hardly been one-sided with Republican legislators largely in
support and Democrats against. Furthermore, Republican
members of Congress have not always been solicitous of expansive presidential authority by Democratic presidents during
wartime.
On the contrary, Republican members of Congress in the
1990s were often vocally critical of Clinton’s deployments in
242
Haiti and Somalia. Senator Dole, who supported Clinton’s
engagements in the Balkan region, threatened to introduce legislation that would have forced the President to seek authoriza-

241. There is some commentary that suggests that this dynamic occurs. See
id. at 7 (arguing that Congress’s role in foreign affairs is cyclical; it acquiesces
to presidential encroachment initially, and then asserts itself again whenever
executive usurpations seem to get out of hand).
242. See Michael R. Gordon, Top U.S. Officials Outline Strategy for Haiti
Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A1 (“Administration officials face
strong opposition to an invasion from Republicans in Congress . . . .”). For a
discussion of the partisan nature of the congressional reaction to Clinton’s
Somalia deployment, see Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them:
Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers
Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 683–88 (1995). There was also some Republican resistance to Clinton’s Kosovo intervention, but the positions of the party
leaders were more mixed and ambivalent. For instance, Dole was a keen supporter of Clinton’s decision. See HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 28, at 37.
But see Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design,
123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 641–42 n.53 (2010) (discussing Republican opposition
to Clinton’s unilateral use of force in Kosovo).
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243

tion for the Haiti deployment in 1994. And in the spring of
1993, Republican members of Congress voted overwhelmingly
against a resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. forces
244
in Somalia.
Or consider the response of Republican legislators to President Obama’s 2011 decision to direct air strikes in Libya. The
objective of the Libyan air strikes was to protect citizens during
245
a popular uprising against the rule of Muammar Qadhafi.
But Congress never formally authorized the Libyan intervention, prompting criticism that President Obama had violated
246
Congress’s constitutional prerogative to “Declare War.” The
Office of Legal Counsel subsequently issued a memorandum defending the legality of the President’s action by invoking past
247
historical practice of unilateral presidential uses of force. And
a separate opinion by the Legal Advisor in the State Department also argued that the U.S. role in Libya did not amount to
“hostilities” for purposes of triggering the sixty-day require248
ment for congressional authorization under the “WPR.”
By the summer of 2011, a group of Republican legislators,
including House Speaker John Boehner, criticized the legal
opinion by the State Department as “not credible” and argued
249
that the President might be violating the WPR.
At first blush, the Republican response seems to undermine the partisan model’s prediction that the party of the right
will prefer presidential flexibility during wartime while the left
will be against. However, the facts of the matter are not so
clear cut. During Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo, for instance,
then Representative Boehner argued that invoking the WPR
243. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has Authority He Needs to Invade
Haiti, Top Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at A1.
244. See Ford, supra note 242, at 684.
245. See Elisabeth Bumiller & David D. Kirkpatrick, Airstrikes Pound Libyan Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, at A15.
246. See Michael Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the
Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.F., 2011, at 1, 18–19;
Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 24,
2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/24/obama_s_
unconstitutional_war.
247. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, supra note 113, at 6.
248. Questions for the Record Submitted to Legal Adviser Harold Hongju
Koh by Sen. Richard G. Lugar Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. (2011), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/libya/
LugarKoh062811.pdf.
249. See Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Vote in Congress Reveals Dissent on Role in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A10.
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would be “likely to tie the hands of future presidents who will
need the authority to lead in crises with less ambiguous impli250
cations for our national security.” And in a March 23, 2011
letter to President Obama, Speaker Boehner raised some policy
questions about the wisdom of the Libya intervention, but
nonetheless did not raise any concerns about its constitutional251
ity.
To be sure, one may take these apparent inconsistencies as
evidence of the sometimes calculating and myopic nature of
modern partisan politics. However, there is a more charitable
reading of this dynamic that admits of more in-depth analysis.
In his March 2011 letter, Speaker Boehner seemed to be willing
to acknowledge that President Obama had the authority to deploy troops without first seeking congressional authorization,
which would be consistent with what a partisan model would
252
predict. Nonetheless, Boehner also sought to preserve Congress’s prerogative to invoke the statutory requirements of the
WPR once the sixty-day clock had run and the deployment had
started to become less popular. And while Boehner had previously expressed concerns about the wisdom of the WPR under
253
the Clinton administration, it would not be out of character
for him as the Speaker of the House to invoke the WPR’s legal
requirements provided that the statute had not already been
struck down by a court. Finally, the congressional backlash
against the President’s legal opinion on the Libyan intervention
was hardly a one-sided partisan affair. For instance, the congressional contingent that filed suit challenging the legality of
the Libya intervention was led by Dennis Kucinich, a liberal
254
Democrat from Ohio.
Setting aside questions of legality, however, Republican
members of Congress largely opposed or seemed ambivalent
255
about Obama’s Libyan air strikes, as they were about Clin250. See Sarah Parnass, In War Powers Act Debate, Obama and Boehner
Throw Past Quotes at One Another Revealing Inconsistencies, ABC NEWS
(June 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/in-war-powersact-debate-obama-and-boehner-throw-past-quotes-at-one-another-revealinginconsistencie/.
251. See Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Mar. 23, 2011), available
at http://journaloflaw.us/1%20Pub.%20L.%20Misc./1-2/JoL1-2,%20PLM1-2.pdf.
252. See id.
253. See Parnass, supra note 250.
254. See Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D.D.C. 2011) (ruling
that congressional plaintiffs lacked standing).
255. See David Eldridge, Republicans Criticize Obama on Libya, Iraq,
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ton’s interventions in Haiti and Somalia. This dynamic is consistent with the notion that left-leaning parties will tend to exhibit greater solicitude for humanitarian interventions than
256
their right-leaning counterparts. Nonetheless, the observation that Democrats (or left-leaning parties) might evince
stronger preferences for a certain category of military conflicts
does not imply that parties of the right do not benefit more
than left-leaning parties from presidential flexibility in war
powers. As discussed earlier, the durability of a partisan institutional arrangement actually depends on whether its policy
effects are perceived as not being overwhelmingly skewed in
257
favor of any specific political faction or party. Thus, if all categories of military conflicts tended to benefit the interests of
Republican or right-leaning constituencies, then any configuration of war powers is likely to be highly unstable across electoral periods.
In sum, while Republicans today may as a general matter
prefer more presidential flexibility in war powers than Democrats, it is not necessarily the case that Republicans will consistently tend to side with the President during wartime, especially if different kinds of wars may also have distinct
distributional effects.
IV. WOULD INCREASING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HELP?
One might argue that one way to mitigate the perceived
partisanship in areas like human rights and war powers is to
increase judicial oversight in foreign relations. But there are
many obstacles to impartial judicial decision making in this
arena. Even though judges and academic commentators may
not necessarily be susceptible to the same instrumental motivations as elected officials, they may very well be plagued by both
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/
23/republicans-criticize-obama-libya-iraq/?page=all.
256. See RATHBUN, supra note 35, at 2–3 (arguing that left-leaning parties
in Europe tend to favor humanitarian intervention, although for ideational
reasons). Also, with respect to the Haiti intervention, some commentators remarked on the reversal of roles between the traditionally Hawkish Republicans and Dovish Democrats. See G. Thomas Goodnight & Kathryn M. Olson,
Shared Power, Foreign Policy, and Haiti, 1994: Public Memories of War and
Race, 9 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 601, 608 (2006) (“The Haiti intervention unsettled the grounds upon which the exposition of political positions could be developed and extended to the particular case . . . . Conservatives . . . are the
new doves on Haiti.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
257. See supra Part II.B.
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the kinds of cognitive biases and motivated reasoning that
258
largely track partisan judgments in the electoral arena. Put
simply, when certain constitutional constraints yield distributional policy consequences across political coalitions, it is reasonable to also expect judicial disagreement over the scope of
259
such constraints. In the war powers context, for example, the
risks of agency slack and negative policy outcomes that could
be generated by greater presidential flexibility might be more
260
obvious to left-leaning than right-leaning judges. More broadly, a judge’s perception of the dangers of special interest capture under any particular allocation of constitutional authority
is likely to be different depending on how close the preferences
of the relevant interest group to those of the particular judge.
Take, for instance, the positions often adopted by leading
commentators and some judges over the plausible source of
agency costs in the context of adopting and ratifying human
258. Dan Kahan emphasizes that a cultural cognition approach of judging
may be consistent with the evidence embraced by the social science view of
judges as deliberately pushing purely partisan or ideological objectives. See
Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging, supra note 19, at
413–16. As Kahan explains:
The phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their views about risks and benefits of putatively
dangerous activities to their cultural evaluations of those activities.
Psychologically speaking, it's much easier to believe that behavior one
finds noble is also socially beneficial and behavior one finds base is
dangerous rather than vice versa.
Id. at 417–18. But of course, there is a rich literature in judicial politics that
explores the role of ideology in judicial decision making. See, e.g., EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 17, at 95–111. But the claim here is that even if judges
may sometimes act as policy motivated actors, we can still assume that they
may not have the same incentives to advance the electoral fortunes of a political party as elected officials in the political branches. Indeed, some of the literature has pointed to distinctly legal factors that sometimes drive judicial
outcomes. See generally Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using Federalism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DUKE L.J. 183, 208 (2009) (“Empirical judicial scholars have
not yet proven whether the overwhelming bulk of decisionmaking for courts
can be collapsed down to one dimension of liberalism versus conservatism
without losing much explanatory power—as it can be for Congress.”); Pablo T.
Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals
of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996) (modeling
decision making as a product of a substantive legal issue and federalism, and
providing initial empirical evidence of some cases dividing Justices by these
two dimensions).
259. See Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging, supra
note 19, at 418 (“Research . . . shows that cultural cognition also creates conflict over legally consequential facts.”).
260. See supra notes 228–48, 234–56, 258 and accompanying text.
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rights treaties or applying customary international law norms.
Generally, right-leaning commentators and judges tend to trace
the source of agency costs to left-leaning groups and legal academics who seek to exploit their elite status and influence over
federal judges to push for progressive ideological objectives dis261
favored by a majority. In other words, having failed to convince elected officials about the merits of their position, the assumption is that the progressive groups and their elite cohorts
in the legal academy have turned to courts to overcome the obstacles imposed by federalism and the separation of powers.
But consider a radically different perspective, fashionable
among progressive legal academics and historians, which argues that the postwar movement against human rights treaties
was primarily a creation of southern segregationists who were
concerned that such treaties would be used to dismantle racial
262
discrimination. Or consider the view by some social-science
commentators, such as Andrew Moravcsik, that the ratification
of human right treaties in the United States has been largely
defeated by conservative minorities who have wielded the
263
fragmentation of domestic authority to their advantage.
Central to both sets of claims is the normative assumption
261. See Bolton, supra note 100, at 205–06 (describing a division between
an elite class of academics and media professionals who favor international
law and global governance and a majority of Americans who are against). Indeed, Justice Scalia probably echoed the view of many conservative commentators when he recently declared in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:
The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of
states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a
20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human
rights advocates . . . . The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled
by the proposition that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the death penalty . . . could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of foreigners.
542 U.S. 692, 749–50 (2004) (Scalia J. concurring) (emphasis in original).
Commentators have also observed the risk that courts will cherry pick among
norms of international law that tend to confirm the outcome they would like to
reach for other reasons. See Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions
of Mankind,” 8 GREEN BAG 2d 261, 261–62 (2005).
262. See Henkin, supra note 93, at 348 (“The campaign for the Bricker
Amendment apparently represented a move by anti-civil-rights and ‘states’
rights’ forces to seek to prevent—in particular—bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.”); Natalie Hevener
Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the
United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q.
309, 310 (1988) (emphasizing conservative opposition to racial integration).
263. See Moravcsik, supra note 101, at 150 (describing conservative opposition to human rights treaties in the United States).
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that our constitutional structure ought to reduce the capture of
the political process by narrow interest groups or temporary
264
majorities.
Ironically, to a certain degree, the theoretical
premises relied on by both camps to illustrate the agency cost
problem are both defensible. According to one set of assumptions, favored by conservatives, the fragmentation of authority
or the existence of multiple veto points in the human rights
treaty and customary international law context may decrease
the likelihood that the policy-making process will be hijacked
265
by any one interest group or a temporary majority. However,
under another set of assumptions, favored by progressives, the
proliferation of veto points increases the leverage of electoral
minorities and of sub-national political actors whose prefer266
ences may be out of tune with national majorities.
However, adherents of either side may sometimes make
overbroad empirical claims about the likely preferences of the
median voter, the purported influence of narrow interest
groups, and whether any specific decision to ratify (or nor ratify) a human rights treaty represents a mutually beneficial social outcome. Take, for instance, the claim made by Frank
Holman, the former American Bar Association (ABA) president
and intellectual architect of the Bricker Amendment move264. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 100, at 205–06 (stating that an alliance of
internationalist law professors, media professionals, and members of human
rights and environmental groups, have promoted global governance at the expense of the American people); Moravcsik, supra note 263, at 146, 149–50 (arguing that American politicians and citizens recognize the importance of
spreading civil liberties abroad, yet our constitutional structure allows a small
but powerful minority to prevent enforcement of international human rights
norms at home).
265. See JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 10–21 (1998) (emphasizing the need for stronger constitutional safeguards in the creation of international commitments); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1233–46 (2007)
(discussing the democratic deficit of certain kinds of international law, including customary international law). Of course, there are scholars who think that
judicial reliance on human rights treaties despite the absence of implementing
legislation giving domestic legal effect to the treaties can be benign. See, e.g.,
Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretative Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 648
(2007) (discussing the benefit to individual rights resulting from the trend of
national courts to recognize international human rights laws).
266. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 322 (2002) (“Because
of the multiplicity of veto points in the legislative process under a separation
of powers system, new laws are extremely difficult to pass, for a minority can
block new legislation.”).
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ment, that most Americans supported the Amendment and that
those who opposed the Amendment were only narrow ideological groups sympathetic to socialist ideals as well as proponents
267
of the so-called “World Government” movement. But there is
little or no survey evidence that would support Holman’s views
about what a majority of Americans thought about human
268
rights treaties. And there is some basis to think that postwar
federal judges were not immune to such partisan rationalizations; indeed, at least one federal judge of that era—Judge
Florence Allen of the Sixth Circuit—wrote an entire book that
seemed to be sympathetic to Holman’s interest group capture
269
account.
By contrast, it is now close to received wisdom among progressive scholars that the Bricker Amendment movement was
270
primarily driven by segregationist conservatives. However,
this progressive characterization is belied by the reality that
sixty-four Senators (out of a total of ninety-six) acted as cosponsors of the 1953 version of the Amendment (exactly the
two-thirds majority required for ratification), and of that num271
ber only thirteen were southern Democrats. On the other
hand, an overwhelming majority of Republican Senators (fortyfive out of forty-eight) were co-sponsors of the 1953 version of
267. See FRANK E. HOLMAN, THE INCREASING NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 17–19 (1955).
268. Indeed, an October 6, 1953, Gallup poll that was introduced into the
Senate record showed that 81% of Americans polled had never heard of the
amendment; of those who had, 9% were in favor, 7% opposed, and 3% had no
opinion. See Gallup Poll Finds Few Voters Show Interest in Bricker Amendment, SPARTANBURG HERALD, Oct. 13, 1953, at 10.
269. To be sure, Judge Allen’s account adopted a much more judicious and
less partisan tone than Holman’s writings, but her ultimate concern that treaties could be used by narrow interest groups to bypass domestic constitutional
constraints echoed themes similar to that of Holman. See FLORENCE
ELLINWOOD ALLEN, THE TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LEGISLATION (1952).
270. See Henkin, supra note 93, at 348.
271. See Schubert, supra note 82, at 266. The key sponsor, Senator Bricker,
was a Midwestern politician and the 1944 Republican vice presidential candidate who had been a long time foe of Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives, but who
otherwise exhibited little or no interest in the postwar civil rights movement.
See RICHARD O. DAVIES, DEFENDER OF THE OLD GUARD: JOHN BRICKER AND
AMERICAN POLITICS, at X–XI, 32–33 (1993). Another sponsor, Republican Senator Robert Taft, also from Ohio and an opponent of the New Deal, happened to
be a strong supporter of civil rights who in 1946 had sought to propose legislation that would effectively abolish racial discrimination in the workplace—
about twenty years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See David Freeman
Engstrom, The Taft Proposal of 1946 & the (Non-) Making of American Fair
Employment Law, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 181, 182 (2006).
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the Amendment and most of these Republican Senators were
272
non-Southerners. In addition, the interest groups that testified in support of the Amendment ranged from the United
States Chamber of Commerce, the American Medical Association, the leadership of the American Bar Association, and the
National Economic Council as well as ideological/patriotic
273
groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution. The
distribution of support and opposition to the various versions of
the Amendment transcended traditional geographical or ideo274
logical lines on issues like segregation, with most Republican
Senators from all regions in the country in favor and a significant majority of Democratic Senators against.
In sum, the strong emphasis on either socialist sympathizers or southern segregationist influences in the interest group
account of the Bricker Amendment is somewhat misleading. At
bottom, the notion that conflicts over human rights treaties in
the United States can be best explained by public choice accounts of interest group capture rests on suspect premises. The
politics underlying international human rights treaty ratification is not necessarily characterized by diffuse costs borne by a
majority with concentrated benefits accruing largely to either
conservative or liberal special interest groups. On the contrary,
there is usually intense lobbying by ideological groups aligned
with the major parties on both sides of the issue, making dependence on interest group capture theories particularly problematic.
Thus, one needs to be careful in suggesting that judicial intervention may be the solution to the risk of interest group capture of the institutional framework for foreign affairs. Partisan
groups—core constituents affiliated with either of the major political parties—may play a bigger role than undifferentiated
and narrow interest groups in structuring political conflict in
this arena. But there is no reason to think that judges will be
less susceptible to the kinds of cognitive and political biases
272. See Schubert, supra note 82, at 266.
273. See supra notes 78–101 and accompanying text.
274. Indeed, given that the Bricker Amendment movement took place
years before the partisan realignment of the 1960s in which southern whites
started to flee the Democratic Party, it seems odd to cast what was ostensibly
a partisan Republican proposal as motivated primarily by segregationist impulses. See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989) (theorizing about causes and consequences of postwar partisan realignment on race
issues).
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that influence such groups, especially when either an expansive
or narrow interpretation of the foreign affairs powers is likely
to generate policy outcomes that fall along a left-right spectrum.
CONCLUSION
The benign account of the allocation of constitutional authority between the President and Congress is captured by this
passage from Cass Sunstein’s study of post New Deal constitutionalism:
The distribution of national powers was designed to check unenlightened or self-interested representatives. Above all, it diffused governmental power, reducing the likelihood that any branch would be able
to use its power against all or parts of the citizenry. The system of
checks and balances allowed each branch—armed with its own ambi275
tions—to attempt to counter the other.

These kinds of explanations assume that structural constitutional arrangements, such as the allocation of foreign affairs
powers between the political branches, will serve to enhance
the national welfare. Furthermore, such explanations tend to
privilege the notion that such arrangements will be stable and
enduring because they were originally negotiated by a founding
generation with the goal of obviating the self-serving or narrow
interests of political factions. If any constitutional change occurs incrementally without formal amendment, such as some
have argued occurred after WWII, it is assumed to be due to
the institutional empire building ambitions of the political
276
branches or pressures by populist movements.
By contrast, this Article has argued that the scope of the
Foreign Affairs Constitution has often been the source of significant contention by partisan groups with narrow and conflicting
political objectives. In this picture, a hawkish group may seek
to advance an expansive vision of the Foreign Affairs Constitution largely because it results in policy outcomes that empower
its supporters at the expense of the political opposition, even if
such a vision may ultimately harm the national interest. On
the other hand, a dovish coalition that is under threat of being
marginalized will then resist the hawks’ constitutional vision,
even if such a vision may benefit the national interest by
275. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 433 (1987).
276. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 55, at 802–03 (referring to populist postwar constitutional movement that changed the understanding of the
treaty clause).
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providing the policy flexibility to meet unpredictable security
threats. At bottom, such partisan divisions undermine the conventional assumption that one can discern an unbiased vision
of the national interest in foreign affairs. For while actors
across the political spectrum may agree in principle that promoting international peace or resisting foreign aggression are
desirable objectives, they are likely to disagree as to the institutional means for achieving these objectives, especially when
alternative means have significant distributional implications
for partisan constituencies.

